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INTRODUCTION
This article compares and examines the existing legal frameworks
governing athletic eligibility rules and dispute resolution processes for
Olympic, professional, college, and high school sports from both private and
public law perspectives.
At all levels of sports competition, monolithic sports leagues and
governing bodies1 establish eligibility requirements and conditions that
must be satisfied for an individual to participate. Most governing bodies
have broad, exclusive authority to regulate a single sport or group of sports
on an international, national, or statewide basis, which provides the
corresponding power to exclude or limit athletic participation
opportunities. In some instances, unilaterally established eligibility rules
either completely preclude an individual from athletic participation or
condition his or her right to participate on compliance with several
requirements.
Participation in organized competitive sports provides several
significant tangible and intangible benefits to athletes, while unifying
members of an increasingly racially, culturally, and religiously diverse
I Athletes often have no alternative opportunities to participate in a sport at the subject level of
competition. For example, the National Football League was found to be the sole purchaser of
the services of major league professional football players in the United States. USFL v. NFL, 644
F. Supp.1040, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), afrd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988). The International
Olympic Committee has "supreme authority" over Olympic sports competition, and its
recognized international federations are the worldwide governing bodies for their respective
sports. International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, Rul. 1 at 13 (2007), available at
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en-report122.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). The National
Collegiate Athletic Association has plenary nationwide governing authority over its 1,281
member universities and colleges and approximately 400,000 student-athletes. Each of the fifty
state school athletic governing bodies has exclusive, broad authority to regulate interscholastic
sports competition within its state.
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populace.2  At the professional and Olympic sport levels, athletic
participation brings player contracts, prize earnings, and endorsement
contracts, as well as psychological and social rewards. At the collegiate level,
student-athletes receive athletic scholarships worth many thousands of
dollars. Although relatively few of the more than seven million high school
student-athletes or 400,000 National Collegiate Athletic Association
student-athletes have the exceptional talent necessary to play a professional
or Olympic sport, recent empirical research proves that they all derive
important intangible benefits from organized sports competition, including
educational and character development with life-long individual and social
effects. 3
Given the substantial benefits that athletes derive from athletic
participation, this article assesses whether the developing discreet bodies of
international, national, and state law appropriately regulate the
promulgation and application of athlete eligibility rules by monolithic sports
leagues and governing bodies with broad, plenary authority to oversee
Olympic, professional, college, and high school sports. In conducting our
analysis, we consider the effectiveness of athletes' voices and voting rights
in the rule-making process; the nature and effect of the rules; and the nature
and scope of judicial and arbitral review of the rules, their application, and
their enforcement.
We begin Part I with an analysis of the international legal framework for
resolving Olympic and international sports eligibility disputes. Although
there is no general legal right to participate in athletic competition
protected by international law or human rights agreements, the Olympic
Charter expressly states that the "practice of sport is a human right."4
Although this is no more than a conditional right to participate if an athlete
complies with several eligibility requirements, the Olympic Charter
prohibits class-based discrimination and the International Olympic
2 See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 329, 341 (1996) (arguing that "in our diverse culture,
characterized by a wide variety of ethnic, religious, socio-economic and other groups, there may
well be no other force quite like sport, in terms of bringing people of diverse backgrounds
together in pursuit of a common purpose").
3 See infra notes 184-99 and accompanying text. Of course, if it is not properly managed and
regulated, athletic participation can conflict with important values that the playing of sports is
intended to promote, and thus has the potential to result in adverse social consequences. See
Matthew J. Mitten, Timothy Davis, Rodney K. Smith & Robert C. Berry, Sports Law and
Regulation: Cases, Materials, and Problems 6-8 (2005). It is nevertheless undeniable that
substantial indirect and direct social benefits result from athletic participation.
4 See infra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
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Committee Athlete Commission provides Olympic athletes with a voice in
the promulgation of eligibility rules. The Court of Arbitration for Sport
("CAS"), an independent and impartial arbitral tribunal, conducts de novo
review of the rules, interpretation, and application of the International
Olympic Committee and other international sports governing bodies that
affect an athlete's eligibility to participate in the Olympics and other
international sports competitions.
We then explore how federal law, specifically the Ted Stevens Olympic
and Amateur Sports Act, protects the participation opportunities for U.S.
athletes who participate in Olympic and international sports by requiring
"the swift and equitable" resolution of eligibility disputes pursuant to a de
novo American Arbitration Association ("AAA") process.5 Courts have only a
limited role in resolving eligibility disputes, but we generally conclude that
CAS and AAA arbitration are both independent and fair processes that
effectively protect athletes' participation rights.
In Part 11 we examine the legal framework defining the parameters of
permissible athlete eligibility requirements and protecting U.S. professional
athletes' participation opportunities. The framework consists of a mix of
federal labor, antitrust, and civil rights law, in addition to state contract law.
Through the collective bargaining process, unionized professional team
sport athletes have an effective voice in the establishment of eligibility
requirements, limits on league and club disciplinary authority that affect
their participation interests, and dispute resolution procedures (generally
arbitration before a mutually acceptable person or panel). We conclude that
professional team sport athletes possess legal protections that equal (or
perhaps even exceed) those of Olympic sport athletes, while individual sport
athletes have a lesser, but not necessarily ineffective, measure of protection.
We begin Part III by describing the significant and unique benefits
derived by student-athletes who participate in intercollegiate and
interscholastic athletics. In contrast to Olympic and professional athletes,
college and high school student-athletes do not have an effective voice
regarding eligibility rules, which are unilaterally established by sports
governing bodies or their member educational institutions. Nevertheless,
relying on the academic abstention doctrine, courts generally provide
extreme deference to college and high school sports governing authorities
and refrain from any more than minimal scrutiny of the merits of athletic
eligibility disputes. Courts refuse to recognize a legally protected interest in
s See infra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
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college or high school athletic participation and, absent clear violation of an
independent constitutional or civil right, apply only rational basis or
arbitrary and capricious standards of review. We conclude that the
judiciary's blanket exercise of such extreme deference, in at least some
cases, deprives college and high school student-athletes of an effective
external means of successfully challenging eligibility rules and adverse
determinations by sports governing bodies and educational institutions.
Moreover, this legal framework contrasts sharply with the generally
adequate process and substantive legal protections afforded to Olympic and
U.S. professional athletes.
Finally, in Part IV, we assert that the important individual and societal
benefits of organized athletic participation supports greater legal
recognition and enhanced protection of a student-athlete's opportunity to
participate in intercollegiate and interscholastic sports competition. We
acknowledge that public policy and practical considerations do not warrant
providing several million student-athletes with the same nature and scope
of legal protection accorded to a much smaller number of Olympic and
professional athletes whose livelihood is elite sports competition. We
conclude with a proposal for a heightened level of judicial scrutiny to be
applied in athletic eligibility disputes-a level that recognizes the legitimate
interests of sports governing bodies and educational institutions but also
effectively protects the opportunities of student-athletes who participate in
college and high school sports competition.
I. OLYMPIC AND INTERNATIONAL SPORTS COMPETITION
A. International Legal Framework
Global athletic competition is an essential part of the world's culture.
The Olympic Games and Winter Olympic Games occur every four years, with
thousands of participating athletes and hundreds of millions of worldwide
spectators and viewers. 6 Despite geographical distance and language
barriers among participating athletes and fans, sports provide a forum for
maximizing unique physical talents and enhancing personal growth as well
as for increasing understanding, appreciation, and respect among diverse
6 World Cup competition in men's and women's soccer (or "football" as this popular game is
called outside of the United States) is another major international sports competition that, like
the Paralympic Games and Special Olympics, occurs every four years. Other major trans-national
sports events, including, for example, the Asian Games, the Commonwealth Games, and the Pan
American Games, are also regularly held.
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cultures and societies. 7 Although the individual benefits of athletic
participation and corresponding collective benefits to our global society
resulting from widespread sports competition are generally acknowledged,
there is no individual legal right to engage in sport under international
human rights agreements or other international laws.8
1. A Fundamental Principle of Olympism: "The Practice of Sport Is a Human
Right"-A Canard?
The Olympic Charter 9 codifies the fundamental principles, rules, and
by-laws adopted by the International Olympic Committee ("IOC") that
govern the Olympic Movement. 10 All members of the Olympic Movement,
which comprises the IOC, international sports federations ("IFs"), national
Olympic committees ("NOCs"), and national sports governing bodies or
federations ("NGBs"), are bound by a series of interlocking agreements to
comply with the Charter. The IOC, an international private non-profit
organization domiciled in Lausanne, Switzerland, is the "supreme authority"
of the Olympic Movement, and its interpretations of the Charter are final."1
Each IF is a nongovernmental organization that functions as the worldwide
governing body for a particular sport (or group of sports). For example, the
International Amateur Athletic Federation governs track and field, and its
member NGBs (e.g., USA Track & Field) have national regulatory authority
over that sport in their respective countries. Each NOC (e.g., the United
7 Willye White, an African-American woman who was a member of four U.S. Olympic teams that
competed in international track and field competitions in more than 150 countries, said: "Before
my first Olympics, I thought the whole world consisted of cross burnings and lynchings. The
Olympic Movement taught me not to judge a person by the color of their skin but by the contents
of their hearts. Athletics was my flight to freedom ... my acceptance in the world. I am who I am
because of my participation in sports." Fred Mitchell, Olympian's Finest Work Came Long After
Games, Chi. Trib., Feb. 10, 2007, at 1.
8 James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law at 126-27 (2d ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc.
2004).
9 Olympic Charter, supra note 1. Currently, 41 of the IOC's 114 members (i.e., forty percent)
competed in the Olympic Games. Most drafters of the Olympic Charter reside in civil law
countries, the laws of which are primarily embodied in codes. See Official Website of the Olympic
Movement, International Olympic Committee Members, available at
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organization/ioc/members/#members (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
10 Paragraph 3 of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism defines the "Olympic Movement" as
"the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme
authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism."
Id. at 9. All organizations, athletes, and others belonging to the Olympic Movement must be
recognized by the IOC and comply with the Olympic Charter. Id. at 11.
1 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, Rul. 1, at 13.
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States Olympic Committee) has exclusive authority regarding the
representation of its country or IOC-recognized geographical territory in
connection with the Olympic Games.
Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern Olympic Games, said,
"Sport is part of every man and woman's heritage and its absence can never
be compensated for."12 The fourth Fundamental Principle of Olympism
embodied in the Charter expressly states, "The practice of sport is a human
right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising sport, without
discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual
understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play."13 The fifth
Principle states that "[a]ny form of discrimination with regard to a country
or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is
incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement."'14 The "right" to
practice sport codified in the Olympic Charter protects athletes only from
being discriminated against on enumerated grounds by any member of the
Olympic Movement. 5 Rule 45(2) of the Charter expressly states that
"[n]obody is entitled to any right of any kind to participate in the Olympic
Games."'16 An athlete may participate in the Olympic games only if he or she
satisfies several requirements and conditions specified in the Charter's
Eligibility Code. 17
Among the more important eligibility requirements an athlete must
satisfy are to abide by the Olympic Charter and the relevant IF rules
(including the sport's specific eligibility criteria as applied by an IF, NOC,
and NGB) as approved by the IOC; to be entered in the Olympic Games by his
or her NOC; to respect the spirit of fair play and non-violence and behave
accordingly; and to comply fully with the World Anti-Doping Code.18 In
12 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391, at 2.
13 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at 11.
14 Id. Age limits for Olympic Games competitors are prohibited unless prescribed in an IF's
competition rules as approved by the IOC's Executive Board. Olympic Charter, supra note 1, Rul.
43, at 83. This Rule's predecessor prohibited age limits "other than as prescribed for health
reasons in the competition rules of an IF," which appears to be a narrow ground for permissible
age discrimination. Nafziger, supra note 8, at 126-27.
Is Each NOC enters athletes into Olympic events based on the recommendations of the NGB for
the particular sport in its country and has a duty to ensure no athlete is excluded for "racial,
religious or political reasons or by reason of other forms of discrimination." Olympic Charter,
supra note 1, Rul. 45(3), at 83.
16 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, Rul. 45, at 83.
17 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, Rul. 41, at 80-81.
18 The Introduction to the World Anti-Doping Code states that one of its primary objectives is
"[tbo protect the Athletes' fundamental right to participate in doping-free sport and thus
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addition to these eligibility requirements, an athlete must be a "national of
the country of the NOC" entering him.19 The NOC shall enter only athletes
"adequately prepared for high level international competition."2 0
Notwithstanding an athlete's compliance with these requirements, the IOC
has the discretion to refuse to accept entry of any athlete "without
indication of grounds." 2 1 Although these detailed provisions seem to
indicate that the broad language of the fourth Fundamental Principle ("sport
is a human right") may be a canard, Olympic sport governing bodies do not
have unlimited discretion because their athlete eligibility decisions are
subject to independent review.
2. Athlete Eligibility Dispute Resolution Process
The Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS") is a private, specialized
arbitral body based in Lausanne, Switzerland (and thus subject to Swiss
law) that was established by the IOC on April 6, 1983, to resolve sports-
related disputes.2 2 Despite its name, the CAS, whose jurisdiction and
authority as an arbitration tribunal is based on agreement of the parties, is
promote health, fairness and equality for Athletes worldwide." World Anti-Doping Agency,
World Anti-Doping Code 1 (2003), available at http:www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/code-v3.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
19 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, Rul. 42, at 81.
20 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, Rul. 45(4), at 83.
21 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, Rul. 45(2), at 83. This rule was added after the CAS ad hoc
Division at the Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City determined that the IOC had no authority
under the then-current Charter to refuse to allow an otherwise qualified athlete to compete in
the Games. Based on its view that an IF's improper reduction of the athlete's doping sanction
violated the WADA Code and was simply a device to enable him to compete in the Olympic
bobsled competition, the lOG had declared him ineligible. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G.
Salt Lake City 2002) 001, Sandis Prusis v. IOC, award of 5 Feb. 2002 in Vol. 3 Digest of CAS
Awards 2001-2003 573 (Matthiew Reeb 2004). See infra notes 42, 56-57 and accompanying text.
22 The International Council of Arbitration for Sport ("IcAS"), a group of twenty high-level jurists
that currently includes two U.S. members, Michael B. Lenard and Judge Juan R. Torruella, now
oversees the CAS and appoints its member arbitrators. CAS arbitrators are representative of the
world's continents and are appointed for four-year renewable terms by ICAS based on
recommendations from the IOC, IFs, NOcs, and athletes' groups. They must have legal training
and knowledge of sport, be objective and independent in their decisions, adhere to a duty of
confidentiality, and have good command of at least one CAS working language (i.e., English or
French). The ICAS is obligated to "wherever possible, ensure fair representation of the
continents and of the different juridical cultures." Court of Arbitration for Sport, Code of Sports-
Related Arbitration, S16, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitrage-statuts.asp/4-0-
1075-4-1-1/5-0-1089-7-1-1/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2008). The Code of Sports-Related Arbitration
("Arbitration Code"), which is drafted by ICAS, governs the organization, operations, and
procedures of the CAS. The lOG, IFs, and NOCs fund the operations of ICAS and the GAS.
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not an international court of law. It "provides a forum for the world's
athletes and sports federations to resolve their disputes through a single,
independent and accomplished sports adjudication body that is capable of
consistently applying the rules of different sports organizations .... 23 Its
creation recognizes the need for international sports governance to be
uniform and protective of the integrity of athletic competition, while also
safeguarding all athletes' legitimate rights and adhering to fundamental
principles of natural justice.24
To ensure "fast, fair, and free" resolution of disputes involving an
athlete's eligibility to participate in the Olympic Games, 25 a CAS ad hoc
Division operates at the site of the Games and provides expedited
adjudication (usually within twenty-four hours of the filing of a claimant's
request for arbitration), 26 which provides athletes with the procedural right
to be heard before an independent tribunal. Rule 59 of the Olympic Charter
states that all disputes "arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the
Olympic Games," including an athlete's eligibility to participate in the
Olympics, must be submitted to the CAS ad hoc Division for final and
binding resolution.2 7 The substantive "law" governing an athlete's eligibility
to participate in the Olympic Games consists of the Olympic Charter,
relevant IOC rules, and general principles of law. 28
The CAS also may resolve non-Olympic athlete eligibility disputes
arising out of appeals from the final decisions of an IF pursuant to its
appeals arbitration procedure. 29 These cases normally must be decided
23 Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World's
Sports Disputes, 35 Val. U. L. Rev. 379, 381 (2001).
24 Tricia Kavanagh, The Doping Cases and the Need for the International Court of Arbitration for
Sport, 22 UNSW L.J. 721 (1999).
25 Statement of Michael B. Lenard, an ICAS member who was instrumental in the establishment
of the first CAS ad hoc Division at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. The CAS ad hoc
Division was created so that "no athlete can be left knocking on the door to the gates of the
Olympic village." Id. In other words, all IFs are bound by CAS ad hoc Division awards regarding
an athlete's eligibility to participate in the Olympics. Final and binding arbitration in a single
proceeding provides athletes with a legal process superior to multi-stage litigation in a national
court, which even if successful, may not provide an effective legal remedy. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
IAAF, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
26 See generally Richard H. McLaren, Introducing the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The Ad Hoc
Division at the Olympic Games, 12 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 515 (2001).
27 Olympic Charter, supra note 1, R59, at 104. As a condition of participating in the Olympic
Games, athletes must agree that all eligibility disputes will be finally resolved by the CAS.
28 Court of Arbitration for Sport, Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games, art. 17 (2004).
29 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, S20(b).
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within four months after the filing of an appeal.30 In athlete eligibility
disputes other than those arising out of the Olympic Games, the relevant IF
rules and the law of the country in which the IF is domiciled generally
apply.31
In either CAS ad hoc Division or appeals arbitration, the involved athlete
may be represented by counsel. A panel of three arbitrators (or, at times, a
single arbitrator) adjudicates the athlete eligibility dispute by majority
decision and issues a written award setting forth the reasons for the
decision, which is final and binding on the parties and is usually publicly
disclosed.32 Regardless of its geographical location, the "seat" of all CAS
arbitration proceedings is always Lausanne, Switzerland.3 3 This ensures
uniform procedural rules and substantive law for all CAS arbitrations, which
provides a stable legal framework and facilitates efficient dispute resolution
in locations convenient for the parties.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal ("SFT"), which has the exclusive authority to
review all CAS awards and decisions, 34 has ruled that "the CAS is a true
arbitral tribunal independent of the parties, which freely exercises complete
juridical control over the decisions of the associations which are brought
before it" and "offers the guarantees of independence upon which Swiss law
makes conditional the valid exclusion of ordinary judicial recourse."35
Subsequently, the SFT held that the CAS now is sufficiently independent
from the IOC for its decisions "to be considered true awards, equivalent to
the judgments of State courts."36 It concluded that "[a]s a body which
reviews the facts and the law with full powers of investigation and complete
freedom to issue a new decision in place of the body that gave the previous
30 Id. at R59.
31 Id. at R58.
32 For the appeals arbitration procedure, each party selects one arbitrator, and the President of
the Appeals Arbitration Procedure appoints the third arbitrator who serves as the president of
the panel. Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, R48, R53, and R54. Ad hoc Division
arbitrators come from a pool of eleven or twelve CAS arbitrators chosen by ICAS for the Olympic
Games. Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games, supra note 28, art. 3 (2004).
33 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, R28.
34 Court of Arbitration for Sport, Guide to Arbitration, R59, available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/arbitrage-reglementasp/4-O-1031-4-1-1/5-O-1089-7-1-1/ (last visited Oct 29,
2008).
35 G. v. Federation Equestre Internationale (Swiss Federal Tribunal 1993) in Vol. 1 Digest of CAS
Awards 1986-1998 561, at 568-69 (Matthiew Reeb 1998). For further explanation, see id. at
xxv-xxvi.
36 A. and B. v. IOC, (Swiss Federal Tribunal 2003) in Vol. 3 Digest of CAS Awards 2001-2003 674,
at 689 (Matthiew Reeb 2004). For further explanation, see id. at xxix-xxx.
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ruling... the CAS is more akin to a judicial authority independent of the
parties."37
i. Emerging Principles of CAS Jurisprudence
Unlike common law judicial precedent, "[i]n CAS jurisprudence there is
no principle of binding precedent, or stare decisis."38 Nevertheless, although
the CAS is an arbitral tribunal and the majority of its arbitrators have a civil
law background, it is ironic that CAS awards are forming a body of lex
sportiva.39 In a manner similar to appellate courts, different panels of CAS
arbitrators may reach varying conclusions regarding the meaning of a rule
and its application in a particular case.40 However, "a CAS Panel will
obviously try, if the evidence permits, to come to the same conclusion on
matters of law as a previous CAS Panel."4 1 A developing lex sportiva is
shaping the nature and scope of legal protection of an athlete's opportunity
to participate in the Olympic Games and other international sports
competitions, although our conclusions are necessarily tentative because all
CAS awards currently are not generally available for review and analysis.
Whenever an athlete's eligibility to compete may be adversely affected,
the CAS imposes an obligation on the IOC and other international sports
governing bodies to provide the athlete with a fair opportunity to be heard.
Thus, the CAS recognizes an athlete's procedural "right to be heard as one of
the fundamental principles of due process." 42
37 Id. at 684-88.
38 Arbitration CAS 2004/A/628, IAAF v. USA Track and Field & Jerome Young, award of 28 June
2004 73 at 18 [hereinafter Jerome Young].
39 Professor Jim Nafziger has observed that CAS awards "provide guidance in later cases,
strongly influence later awards, and often function as precedent," which reinforce and help
elaborate "established rules and principles of international sports law." lames A. R. Nafziger,
International Sports Law 48 (2d ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2004). Professor Allan Erbsen
asserts that "the gradual accretion of CAS precedent that is often labeled as Lex Sportiva can
more helpfully be understood as comprising several distinct approaches to legal analysis that
rely on diverse sources of governing principles." Allan Erbsen, The Substance and Illusion of Lex
Sportiva, in The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984-2004 at 452 (I.S. Blackshaw, R.C.R.
Siekmann, and J.W. Soek, eds., 2006).
40 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA Advisory Opinion, 21 Apr.
2006, 84 at 31 (observing that different CAS panels may have a "different understanding" when
applying same fault standard in doping cases).
41 Jerome Young, supra note 38, at 73.
42 Arbitration CAS 2000/A/317, A. v. Federation Internationale des Luttes Associees, award of 9
July 2001, in Vol. 3 Digest of CAS Awards 2001-2003 159, 162 (Matthiew Reeb 2004);
Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Salt Lake City 2002) 001, Sandis Prusis v. IOC, award of 5
Feb. 2002 in Vol. 3 Digest of CAS Awards 2001-2003 573 (Matthiew Reeb 2004).
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In reviewing a sports governing body's interpretation or application of
rules affecting an athlete's eligibility to compete pursuant to the ad hoc
Division or appeals arbitration procedure, the CAS conducts a de novo
hearing.43 If the athlete was denied due process in the governing body's
internal proceeding, this violation is remedied by providing a full and fair
opportunity to be heard during the CAS arbitration. 44 Moreover, to provide
"a safeguard for athletes [that] substantially ameliorates the possibility of
flawed or arbitrary decision-making" 45 by international sports governing
bodies, "it is the duty of the [CAS panel] to make its independent
determination of whether the Appellant's contentions are correct, not to
limit itself to assessing the correctness of the award or decision from which
the appeal was brought-"46 In other words, "it is to be a completely fresh
rehearing of the dispute and not one narrowly focused on finding error in
the original decision."47
In defining the nature and scope of an athlete's substantive participation
rights, the CAS has not construed the Olympic Charter as creating an
absolute right to participate in a sport. The CAS also has concluded that
"there is no rule of 'fairness,' to be derived from the Olympic Charter's
acknowledgment that the practice of sport is a fundamental human right,
which would under circumstances create an outer time limit of Olympic
ineligibility." 48 Rather than applying a "fairness" requirement in athlete
eligibility disputes on a case-by-case basis, the CAS appears to provide a
significant degree of deference to international sports governing bodies
regarding their authority to establish eligibility rules, and it has not relied
on this provision of the Olympic Charter to substitute its judgment for IOC
or IF eligibility determinations. For example, one CAS panel concluded that,
although a particular eligibility rule may work hardship in individual cases,
it does not "prove the rule was not enacted in the pursuit of legitimate
43 Guide to Arbitration, supra note 34, R57 (stating, with regard to appeals arbitration, that the
CAS "shall have full power to review the facts and the law." Article 16, which applies to ad hoc
Division arbitration, provides that "[tlhe Panel shall have full power to establish the facts on
which the application is based.").
44 Id. See also Arbitration GAS 94/129, USA Shooting & Q. v. UIT, award of 23 May 1995, in Vol. 1
Digest of CAS Awards 1986-1998 187,203 (Matthiew Reeb 2004).
45 Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1574, D'Arcy v. Australian Olympic Committee, award of 7 July 2008
at 22.
46 Id. at 18.
47 Id. at 22.
48 Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 001, USOc and USA Canoe/Kayak v. IOC,
award of 13 Sept. 2000, in Court of Arbitration for Sport, GAS Awards - Sydney 2000, 13, 21
(2000).
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general interest."49
The CAS has ruled that the monolithic position of an international
sports governing body imposes a "duty of confidence" owed to athletes
whose eligibility to compete may be adversely affected by its exercise of
disciplinary authority.5 0 This legal duty requires that the governing body not
act in "bad faith," i.e., in a "completely arbitrary, blatantly, unsustainably,
unreasonably or abusively manner."5' The CAS determined that this duty is
satisfied if the sports governing body fully complies with its own rules when
making athlete eligibility determinations.5 2 At the same time, CAS de novo
review assures that athletes incorrectly ruled ineligible by governing board
officials in a manner inconsistent with applicable rules will be reinstated.
The CAS has implicitly applied this standard by requiring that
doping rules provide clear notice of the prohibited conduct 3 and that
disqualification or suspension of an athlete must be an authorized sanction
for the rule violation.5 4 As a CAS panel explained:
49 Id.
so Arbitration CAS 95/142, L. v. FINA, award of 14 Feb. 1996, in Vol. 1 Digest of CAS Awards
1986-1998 at 225, 243-44 (Matthiew Reeb 2004).
51 Id. at 243.
52 Id. at 244.
53 See, e.g., Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Nagano 1998) 002, R. v. IOC, award of 12 Feb.
1998 in Vol. 1 Digest of CAS Awards 1986-1998 419 (Matthiew Reeb 2004) (overturning alleged
doping violation because neither IOC nor international skiing federation rules banned athlete's
usage of marijuana); Arbitration CAS 96/149, A.C. v. FINA, award of 13 Mar. 1997 in Vol. 1 Digest
of CAS Awards 1986-1998 251 (Matthiew Reeb 2004) ("[Ilt is incumbent both upon the
international and the national federation to keep those within their jurisdiction aware of the
precepts of the relevant codes."). Id. at 262. A full analysis of doping rules and the process for
imposing sanctions for doping is outside the scope of this article. For scholarly commentary
concerning these issues, see Hayden Opie, Drugs in Sports and the Law-Moral Authority,
Diversity and the Pursuit of Excellence, 14 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 267 (2004). See also Michael
Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for Sport
Can Do Its job Better, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.I. 1203 (2005).
54 See, e.g., USOC and Athletes v. IOC & IAAF, Arbitration CAS 2004/A/725, award of 20 July 2005
[hereinafter USOC and Athletes] (holding that disqualification of team's race results because one
team member was ineligible to compete due to doping violation was not an authorized sanction
under applicable IAAF rules); Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 010, Tzagaev
v. IWF, award of 25 Sept. 2000 in Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS Awards - Sydney 2000, 101
(2000) (holding that disqualification of entire weightlifting team, including innocent athletes,
was not an enumerated sanction for other team members' doping violations). Sanctions for
doping violations also must be proportional to an athlete's fault, see e.g., A. v. FILA, Arbitration
CAS 2000/A/317, award of 9 July 2001 in Vol. 3 Digest of CAS Awards 2001-2003 159 (Matthiew
Reeb 2004), the principle of which has been incorporated into the World Anti-Doping Code.
World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 18, §10.5. The CAS has observed that the World Anti-
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The rationale for requiring clarity of rules extends beyond enabling athletes
•.. to determine their conduct ... by reference to understandable rules....
[C]larity and predictability are required so that the entire sport community
are informed of the normative system in which they live, work and compete,
which requires at the very least that they be able to understand the meaning
of rules and the circumstances in which those rules apply.55
For example, in Sandis Prusis v. IOC,56 a CAS ad hoc Division panel ruled
that the Charter did not authorize the IOC to reject a Latvian bobsledder's
entry into the Olympic Games. The athlete's three-month suspension for a
doping violation ended before the bobsled competition in the XIX Winter
Olympic Games began. Believing that the International Bobsleigh and
Tobogganing Federation's reduction of his suspension from the normal two
years for a first doping offense was improper, the IOC's Executive Board
declared him ineligible to compete in the Games. Determining that the
athlete was eligible to participate in the Games, the CAS panel explained:
An athlete has a legitimate expectation that, once he has completed the
punishment imposed on him, he will be permitted to enter and participate in
all competitions absent some new reason for refusing his entry .... [a]s
became clear from statements made by the IOC's representatives during the
hearing, the effect of refusing Mr. Prusis entry was to impose a further
sanction on him for the same offence.5 7
The CAS will construe ambiguous eligibility rules in favor of athletes,
thereby requiring that a sports governing body's limits or conditions on an
athlete's right to participate must be clearly defined. "If a text may be
interpreted in two ways," the CAS will resolve any ambiguity "in favour of an
athlete who is guilty of neither wrong-doing nor even negligence in terms of
the Olympic Charter."58 On the other hand, absent "clear proof of abuse or ill
will," the CAS has declined to review a sports governing body's discretionary
refusal to waive an unambiguous eligibility rule and permit an athlete to
Doping Agency ("WADA"), which is domiciled in Switzerland, did so to ensure that doping
sanctions affecting athletes' eligibility to compete in Olympic and international sports
competitions will be proportionate, which is required by Swiss law. See Mariano Puerta v. ITF,
CAS 2006/A/1025, award of 12 July 2006.
55 1SOC and Athletes, supra note 54, at 23.
56 Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Salt Lake City 2002) 001, Sandis Prusis v. lOC, award of 5
Feb. 2002 in Vol. 3 Digest of CAS Awards 2001-2003 573 (Matthiew Reeb 2004).
57 Id. at 35.
58 Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 005, Perez v. lOc, award of 19 Sept. 2000,
in Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS Awards - Sydney 2000, 53, 62 (2000).
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compete in a sports event
In Miranda v. 1OC ("Miranda I1,59 the CAS upheld the IOC's decision that
Arturo Miranda, a national of both Canada (by becoming a citizen in 1999
after satisfying residency requirements) and Cuba (by birth),60 was not
eligible under Rule 46 to be a member of the Canadian diving team for the
Sydney Olympics. Because Miranda previously represented Cuba in an
international competition (e.g., the 1991 Pan-American Games) and had not
been a Canadian national for three years, he was ineligible unless the
Canadian Olympic Committee ("COC") agreed to waive this requirement.
The COC refused to do so as an invariable matter of principle. Although the
CAS recognized the "primacy of the interests of athletes in the Olympic
Movement, avoidance of discrimination on political and other grounds, and
the central concept that the Games are competitions among athletes rather
than between countries," 61 it rejected Miranda's appeal. The CAS explained
that "the IOC is entitled to rely on the good faith of the NOCs to exercise
their discretion, make decisions, and take actions in accordance with the
principles laid down in the Olympic Charter."62
59 Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 003, Miranda v. IOC, award of 13 Sept.
2000 in Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS Awards - Sydney 2000, 29 (2000) [hereinafter
Miranda I].
60 Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 008, Miranda, COA and Canadian Amateur
Diving Ass'n v. IOC, award of 24 Sept. 2000 in Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS Awards -
Sydney 2000, 83 (2000) [hereinafter Miranda II]. In Miranda II, the CAS rejected his contention
that he became a stateless person in 1995 when he migrated from Cuba to Canada and thus
satisfied Rule 46 under Perez I. Miranda's circumstances were factually different because he did
not defect from Cuba, he had a Cuban passport, he traveled to Cuba on several occasions after
moving to Canada, and he had not been deprived of any fundamental civic rights by the Cuban
government Id.
61 Miranda I, supra note 59, at 39.
62 Id. Although the CAS panel dismissed his appeal, it recognized that the COC's "inexplicable"
decision imposed "considerable hardship" on Miranda, who was ineligible to compete for the
Cuban Olympic team under FINA rules, because he did not reside in Cuba during the twelve
months before the Sydney Olympics. Id. at 40. Characterizing Miranda's ineligibility to
participate "in light of the principle that the interests of athletes 'constitute a fundamental
element' of the Olympic Movement," the CAS requested that the IOC ask the COC to reconsider its
decision. Id. at 40. The CAS also recommended that the IOC consider modifying Rule 46 to avoid
unintended hardship to individual athletes in circumstances such as the present one. The IOC did
so, which may reflect the ability of the CAS to influence IOC rule-making in the same manner that
courts may affect the legislative process. Bylaw 2 to Rule 42 (formerly Rule 46) now provides
that an athlete who changed his nationality or acquired a new one is eligible "to represent his
new country [in the Olympic Games] provided that at least three years have passed since the
competitor last represented his former country." Olympic Charter, supra note 1, R. 42, Bylaw 2,
at 81-82.
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ii. Swiss Federal Tribunal Review of CAS Awards
The Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law 63 provides for
judicial review of a CAS arbitration award by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
("SFT") on very narrow grounds. The SFT will vacate an arbitration award if
the CAS panel was constituted irregularly, erroneously held that it did or did
not have jurisdiction, ruled on matters beyond the submitted claims, or
failed to rule on a claim. An award also may be vacated if the parties are not
treated equally by the CAS panel, if a party's right to be heard is not
respected, or if the award is incompatible with Swiss public policy.64
To date, the SFT has reviewed very few CAS awards regarding athlete
eligibility issues, most of which involve appeals of sports governing body
disciplinary sanctions for violations of doping rules. It exercises judicial
review because "suspension from international competitions is far more
serious than simple sanctions designed to protect the smooth running of a
sport and constitutes a statutory punishment that affects the legal interests
of the person concerned."6
In Canas v. ATP Tour,6 6 the SFT refused to enforce the Association of
Tennis Professionals' insistence that athletes waive their right to appeal a
CAS award as a condition of participating in any events organized or
sponsored by the ATP Tour. The SFT initially found that the athlete's
agreement to arbitrate a doping dispute before the CAS is enforceable,
because it "promotes the swift settlement of [sports] disputes . . . by
specialized arbitral tribunals that offer sufficient guarantees of
independence and impartiality." However, the SFT observed that it is
important to ensure that "the parties, especially professional athletes, do
not give up lightly their right to appeal awards issued by a last instance
arbitral body before the supreme judicial authority of the state in which the
arbitral tribunal is domiciled." The SFT explained this apparent
contradiction by stating, "IT]his logic is based on the continuing possibility
of an appeal acting as a counterbalance to the 'benevolence' with which it is
necessary to examine the consensual nature of recourse to arbitration
where sporting matters are concerned." The SFT vacated the CAS award,
which violated the athlete's right to a fair hearing by not providing a
63 Switz.'s Federal Code on Private International Law available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/useful-texts (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
64 Id. at art. 190(2). For further explanation, see The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984-2004 at
37 (lan S. Blackshaw et. al. eds., Asser Press 2006).
65 A. and B. v. lOC, at 2.1 (1st Civil Chamber, May 27, 2003).
66 4P.172/2006, (1st Civ. Law Ct., Mar. 22, 2007).
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reasoned decision for rejecting his arguments that his doping sanction
violated United States and European Union laws. 67
However, the SFT has uniformly rejected challenges to the substantive
merits of a CAS panel's decision.6 8 Although a CAS award may be challenged
on the ground that it is incompatible with Swiss public policy, no athlete has
ever successfully asserted this argument. The SFT has ruled that this
defense "must be understood as a universal rather than national concept,
intended to penalize incompatibility with the fundamental legal or moral
principles acknowledged in all civilized states." 69 According to the SFT,
"even the manifestly wrong application of a rule of law or the obviously
incorrect finding of a point of fact is still not sufficient to justify revocation
for breach of public policy of an award made in international arbitration
proceedings." 70 This standard is "more restrictive and narrower than the
argument of arbitrariness." 71
67 On remand, the CAS panel briefly considered but rejected these claims in its award, while
reaching the same decision. Guillermo Canas v. ATP Tour, CAS 2005/A/951, award of 23 May
2007, at 18.
68 A CAS award also can be attacked if it is incompatible with procedural public policy which
"guarantees the parties the right to an independent ruling on the conclusions and facts
submitted to the arbitral tribunal in compliance with the applicable procedural law; procedural
public policy is violated when fundamental, commonly recognized principles are infringed,
resulting in an intolerable contradiction with the sentiments of justice, to the effect that the
decision appears incompatible with the values recognized in a State governed by the rule of law."
A. and B. v. IOC, at 4.2.1 (1st Civil Chamber, May 27, 2003).
69 N., J., Y., W. v. FINA, 5P.83/1999 at 799 (2d Civil Court, Mar. 31, 1999). To achieve the desired
objective of a uniform, world-wide body of law governing athlete eligibility disputes, a valid CAS
award, which is a foreign arbitration award in all countries except Switzerland, should bar re-
litigation of the merits of athlete eligibility disputes under national or transnational law in a
judicial forum. See Slaney v. IAAF, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 828 (2001)
(holding athlete's state law claims seeking to re-litigate same issues decided by a valid foreign
arbitration award are barred by the New York Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitration Awards, a treaty to which the United States is a signatory). But see Case C-159/04 P,
Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Comm'n of European Communities, 2006 5 C.M.L.R. 18 (ECI 3rd
Chamber, 2006) (holding that despite final and binding CAS award not appealed to Swiss Federal
Tribunal, European Court of lustice allows two Slovenian professional swimmers to challenge
FINA sanctions for positive doping test at world championship in Brazil under European Union
law).
70 FINA, 5P.83/1999 at 779.
71 G. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n (FEI), CAS 92/63, award of Sept 10, 1992 (translation), in Digest of
CAS Awards 1986-1998 115 (Matthiew Reeb, 1998). The SFT held that doping rules prohibiting
the usage of substances that allegedly are not likely to affect a horse's racing performance do not
violate public policy simply because "the norms prescribed by the regulations ... might be
incompatible with certain statutory or legal provisions." Id. at 575.
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In N., J., Y., W. v. FINA,72 the SFT confirmed a CAS award upholding two-
year suspensions imposed on four Chinese swimmers for doping violations.
The athletes claimed the CAS award failed to comply with the principle of
proportionality 73 and thus was incompatible with Swiss public policy,
because the disciplinary sanction was the maximum provided by the
applicable rule and the quantity of the banned substance found in their
urine was very low. Rejecting this argument, the court concluded that the
CAS award did not "constitute an attack on personal rights which was
extremely serious and totally disproportionate to the behavior penalized."7
4
A CAS award also may be attacked on the ground it violates the
principles of good faith and equal treatment, which would be contrary to
Swiss public policy. These principles require CAS panels to treat like cases
alike, thus facilitating the development of a consistent body of lex sportiva.
As illustrated by Raducan v. IOC,7s materially different facts may justify
different CAS awards without contravening these principles. In Raducan, the
CAS found that a Romanian gymnast committed a doping violation by
admittedly taking a cold tablet containing a banned substance, although
there was a thirty-eight milliliter discrepancy between the quantity of urine
she produced at the doping control station and that which arrived at the
laboratory. Relying on a prior CAS award absolving an athlete of an alleged
doping violation because a jar containing his urine sample was not properly
closed and raised the possibility contamination, she asserted that the CAS
panel should have found no doping violation in her case. However, the
applicable rules defined doping as evidence of the use of a prohibited
substance (which was proven by her admission), and the urine discrepancy
did not materially affect test results showing the presence of a banned
substance in her system. Because her case is "totally different from" the
prior CAS award, the SFT found that her claim of equal treatment was
unfounded.7 6
3. Analysis and Conclusions
The Olympic Charter's explicit statement that "the practice of sport is a
human right" protects an athlete's opportunity to participate in the Olympic
Games and other international sports competition only if several
enumerated athlete eligibility requirements and other conditions are
72 5P.83/1999 (2d Civil Court, Mar. 31, 1999).
73 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
74 N., J., Y., W. v. FINA 5P.83/1999 at 780 (2d Civil Court, Mar. 31, 1999).
75 5P.427/2000 (2d Civil Court, Dec. 4,2000).
76 Id. at (G)(3)(b).
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satisfied. The Olympic Charter does provide an essential safeguard by
expressly prohibiting individual athletes from being excluded from
participation in the Olympic Games because of class-based discrimination.
Forty-one of the 114 current IOC members are former Olympians; they
provide an important perspective in IOC rule-making and governance
decisions affecting athletes' eligibility interests. 77 In addition, the IOC
Athlete Commission provides a means for Olympic athletes to have a voice
in IOC affairs.
7
CAS arbitration provides an independent and impartial forum for
quickly and finally resolving the often complex issues arising in athlete
eligibility disputes by an international pool of arbitrators with specialized
expertise in sports law, which increases the likelihood that fair and just
resolutions will occur. The CAS ad hoc Division provides a fast, fair, and free
on-site means of resolving eligibility disputes arising in connection with the
Olympic Games. The CAS appeals arbitration process also provides an
efficient and impartial means of adjudicating athlete eligibility issues arising
in other international sports competitions. The costs of CAS arbitration are
relatively low in comparison to litigation, which facilitates access to this
method of dispute resolution for all athletes, including those with limited
financial resources.79
The evolving lex sportiva suggests that CAS arbitration panels, while
respecting governing bodies' authority to promulgate athlete eligibility
77 See Official Website of the Olympic Movement, International Olympic Committee Members,
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organization/ioc/members/#members (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
For example, IOC President Jacques Rogge was a three-time member of the Belgium Olympic
Yachting Team, and IOC Members Anita DeFrantz, James Easton and Bob Ctvrtlik were U.S.
Olympians. See id.
78 This Commission, which was created on October 27, 1981, consists of eight elected athletes
who participate in summer Olympic sports, four elected athletes who participate in winter
Olympic sports, and seven athletes appointed by the IOC to ensure diversity by sport,
geographical region, gender, and ethnicity. John W. Ruger, Athletes in Olympic Administration,
Olympic Rev. (Dec. 1993), available at
htto://wwwla84foundation.or/OlvmpiclnformationCenter/OlympicReview/1993/ore313/OR
E313zi.pd (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
79 CAS ad hoc Division arbitration is free of charge to the parties. Arbitration Rules for the
Olympic Games, supra note 28, art. 22. An athlete must pay the required fee to submit an appeal
under the CAS appeals arbitration procedure, with the arbitrators determining how the costs of
arbitration are apportioned among the parties as part of their award. Code of Sports-Related
Arbitration, supra note 22, R.64.5. Athletes are responsible for paying the costs of their own legal
representation, witnesses, experts, and interpreters, although the rules governing the appeals
arbitration procedure authorize the arbitrators to grant the prevailing party a contribution
towards its legal fees and other costs. Id.
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rules, recognize the primacy of athletes' interests in the Olympic Movement
and require international sports governing bodies to have clear rules that
are fairly and consistently applied without discrimination. Although the CAS
is authorized to provide de novo review of the merits of athlete eligibility
decisions by the IOC or other international sports governing bodies,80 it
appears to actually apply no more than a deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. Because of the monolithic authority of the
IOC and IFs and the importance of an elite athlete's opportunity to
participate in world-wide sports events, we believe it would be appropriate
for the CAS to provide closer scrutiny of sports governing body rules and
decisions that adversely affect an athlete's eligibility to compete in the
Olympic Games or other international sports competitions.
The Olympic Charter expressly states that "[t]he practice of sport is a
human right"; therefore, it is important to ensure that athletic participation
may be denied only if necessary to achieve a legitimate objective of
international sports competition consistent with the Olympic spirit. For
example, we applaud a recent CAS award ruling that Oscar Pistorius, a South
African athlete who is a double amputee, is eligible to run in IAAF-
sanctioned track events with "Cheetah" model prosthetic legs.81 An IAAF
rule prohibited the use of "any technical device that incorporates springs,
wheels or any other element that provides the user with an advantage over
another athlete not using such a device." The CAS panel rejected the IAAF's
argument that the use of a technical device providing an athlete "with any
advantage, however small, in any part of a competition ... must render that
athlete ineligible to compete regardless of any compensating
disadvantages." It concluded that the use of a passive device such as the
"Cheetah" prosthetic legs does not violate this rule "without convincing
scientific proof that it provides him with an overall net advantage over other
athletes." The panel concluded that, because scientific evidence did not
prove that Pistorius obtained a metabolic or biomechanical advantage from
using the "Cheetah" prosthetic legs, his exclusion would not further the
rule's purpose of ensuring fair competition among athletes.
Athletes have the right to have an adverse CAS award reviewed by the
Swiss Federal Tribunal although its scope of judicial review is very limited.
Nevertheless, this appeal provides a means for judicially vacating a CAS
80 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, R.57, which applies to CAS appeals
arbitration; Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games, supra note 28, arts. 16 & 17, which apply
to the CAS ad hoc Division.
81 Pistorius v. IAAF, CAS 2008/A/1480, award of 16 May 2008.
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award if an athlete's right to be heard is denied, if he or she is not treated
equally and in good faith, or if the merits of the decision violate fundamental
international legal or moral principles. Of course, all CAS appeals arbitration
and ad hoc Division awards must be publicly available and readily
accessible for athletes to exercise their right to be heard effectively and for
their legal counsel to ensure they are treated equally.
B. United States Legal Framework
The United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") is the national Olympic
committee authorized by the IOC to represent the United States in all
matters relating to its participation in the Olympic Games. The USOC selects
a national governing body as the governing authority for each Olympic sport
within the United States, which is a member of the corresponding IF that
governs the sport on a worldwide level. Pursuant to a series of hierarchical
contractual agreements with the IOC and IFs, the USOC and its NGBs are
required to adopt, apply, and enforce IOC and IF rules that determine or
affect American athletes' eligibility to qualify for, or participate in, Olympic
or other international sports competitions. For example, the USOC and NGBs
must comply with the IOC Charter's athlete eligibility requirements and
anti-discrimination provisions protecting athlete participation
opportunities. They also must comply with CAS awards resolving issues
concerning the eligibility of American athletes that arise in connection with
the Olympic Games or in disputes with an IF or the World Anti-Doping
Agency.
As previously discussed, CAS arbitration generally is the agreed forum
for resolving eligibility disputes between a U.S. athlete and the IOC or an IF.
The New York Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration
Awards8 2 requires U.S courts to recognize and enforce valid foreign
arbitration awards, including CAS awards. In Slaney v. IAAF,83 the Seventh
Circuit held that a valid foreign arbitration award precludes an American
athlete from re-litigating the merits of an eligibility dispute in a U.S. court.
The court concluded that "[o]ur judicial system is not meant to provide a
second bite at the apple for those who have sought adjudication of their
disputes in other forums and are not content with the resolution they
received."8 4
82 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
83 244 F.3d 580 (2001).
84 Id. at 591. A U.S. court may be unable to provide effective relief to an American athlete whose
eligibility to participate in sports competition is adversely affected by an IOC or IF rule or
decision, because its judicial authority is not binding on foreign sports governing bodies outside
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1. Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act
The USOC, a federally chartered corporation created by Congress, and
all NGBs must comply with the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports
Act ("Amateur Sports Act"), 85 which establishes a legal framework for
protecting the participation opportunities of Olympic sport athletes.
Although current Olympic athletes are not eligible to be members of the
USOC, the Amateur Sports Act requires that an Athletes' Advisory Council be
established to represent their interests and to ensure open communication
with the USOC.86 It also requires the USOC to ensure that athletes have at
least twenty percent of the membership and voting power held by its Board
of Directors 87 and committees 88 as well as each NGB.8 9
To be eligible to be recognized by the USOC as the NGB for an Olympic
sport, an amateur sports organization must provide all amateur athletes
with an equal opportunity to participate "without discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin."90 Each NGB has an
its jurisdiction. Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.
concurring) (noting that an IF "can thumb its collective nose" at the USOC and ask the IOC to
disqualify the entire U.S. Olympic weightlifting team if the USOC placed an athlete suspended by
the IF on the team); Gahan v. U.S. Amateur Confederation of Roller Skating, 382 F. Supp.2d 1127,
1124 n.4 (D. Neb. 2005) (observing that a U.S. court is unable to protect athletes from decisions
of international sports governing bodies).
8s 36 U.S.C. §220501 (2006). The USOC has a statutory obligation to ensure, directly or indirectly
by delegation to the NGBs for the various sports, "the most competent representation possible"
for the U.S. in each event of the Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan-American Games. 36 U.S.C.
§220503(4) (2006). Its Mission is "[tlo support United States Olympic and Paralympic athletes in
achieving sustained competitive excellence and preserve the Olympic ideals, and thereby inspire
all Americans." United States Olympic Committee, Bylaws of the USOC, art. 11, § 2.1 (2006). The
Stevens Act also requires the USOC to encourage participation opportunities for women, racial
and ethnic minorities, and disabled athletes and to provide assistance necessary to achieve this
objective. 36 U.S.C. §220503(12)-(14).
86 36 U.S.C. §220504(b)(2) (2006). Members of the USOC Athlete Advisory Committee "must
have represented the United States in the Olympic, Pan American, or Paralympic Games, World
Championships, or an event designated as an Operation Gold event within the ten (10) years
preceding election." Bylaws of the USOC, art. XII, § 12.3. The Council's members are elected by U.
S. athletes who currently participate in international amateur athletic competition or did so
within the past ten years. Id.
87 36 U.S.C. §220504(b)(2). Two members of the USOC's Board of Directors are selected from a
group of individuals nominated by the Athletes' Advisory Council. Bylaws of the USOC, art. Ill, §
3.2.
88 36 U.S.C. §220504(b)(2).
89 36 U.S.C. §220522(a)(10) (2006).
90 36 U.S.C. §220522(a)(8). However, an NGB has no authority to regulate high school or college
athletic competition. 36 U.S.C. §220526(a) (2006).
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affirmative duty to encourage and support athletic participation
opportunities for women and those with disabilities.91 An NGB's eligibility
and participation criteria for U.S. athletes to participate in the Olympic,
Paralympic, and Pan American Games must be consistent with those of the
IF for its sport.92 Athletes must be allowed to compete in international
amateur athletic competitions unless the organization conducting the
competition does not meet the applicable sanctioning criteria.93 The
Amateur Sports Act requires the USOC to establish a procedure for
investigating and resolving complaints by athletes alleging that an NGB has
violated these requirements, which adversely affects her or her eligibility to
compete.94
The Amateur Sports Act also mandates that the USOC establish a
procedure for "swift and equitable resolution" of disputes "relating to the
opportunity of an amateur athlete ... to participate" in the Olympic,
Paralympic, Pan-American Games, and world championship competitions
(hereinafter "protected competitions"). 95 The USOC is required to hire an
athlete ombudsman to provide free, independent advice to athletes
regarding resolution of disputes regarding his or her eligibility to
participate in these competitions. 96
Article IX of the USOC's bylaws creates some important procedural and
substantive rights for the "amateur athlete,"97 which also protect U.S.
professional athletes who participate in the Olympic Games and other
international sports competitions. No member of the USOC, such as an NGB,
"may deny or threaten to deny any amateur athlete the opportunity to
participate" in a protected competition.9" An NGB is required to provide fair
notice and an internal hearing before declaring an athlete ineligible to
participate.9 9 The USOC is required "by all reasonable means at its disposal"
to "protect the right of an amateur athlete to participate if selected (or to
91 36 U.S.C. §220524(6)-(7) (2006).
92 36 U.S.C. §220522(a)(14) (2006).
93 36 U.S.C. §220524(5) (2006).
94 36 U.S.C. §220509 (a) (2006). If the USOC finds that an NGB is not in compliance, it is
authorized to place the NGB on probation or revoke its recognition.
9s Id.
96 36 U.S.C. §220509(b). John Ruger, a member of the 1980 U.S. Olympic biathlon team, currently
serves as the USOC athlete ombudsman.
97 An "amateur athlete" is defined as "any athlete who meets the eligibility standards established
by the [NGB] or Paralympic Sports Organization for the sport in which the athlete competes."
Bylaws of the USOC, art. 1, § 1.3(c).
9a Id. art. IX, § 9.1.
99 Id.
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attempt to qualify for selection to participate) as an athlete representing the
United States" in any protected competition.100 The USOC must conduct an
investigation if an athlete alleges a denial of his or her participation rights
by an NGB and promptly attempt to settle the matter."0 ' The Act gives an
athlete the right to submit an eligibility dispute with an NGB to final and
binding arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") if it is not resolved by the USOC to
his or her satisfaction. 10 2 The USOC's chief executive officer may also, in
order to protect an athlete's rights, authorize legal action on the athlete's
behalf or fund the athlete's legal action (including arbitration) against an
NG B.03
2. Athlete Eligibility Dispute Resolution Process
A U.S. athlete has no federal constitutional right to participate in the
Olympic Games. 104 The Amateur Sports Act 05 does not create any
substantive athletic participation rights that athletes can enforce in a
100 Id.
101 Id. art. IX, § 9.2.
102 Id. See also 36 U.S.C. §220522(a)(4)(B) (as a condition of being recognized as an NGB, it must
agree to submit to binding arbitration in any dispute regarding an amateur athlete's opportunity
to participate in a competition).
103 Bylaws of the USOC, art. IX, § 9.9. However, the CEO's decision whether or not to do so "shall
not be construed as an opinion of the [USOC] with respect to the merits of the athlete's claim." Id.
104 In DeFrantz v. USOC, 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980), a group of athletes selected to be
members of the U.S. Olympic team sought injunctive relief enabling them to compete in the 1980
Moscow Olympic Games. The Carter Administration urged a boycott of the Moscow Games to
protest the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Id. Faced with political pressure from
the federal government, threatened legal action by President Carter, and the possible loss of its
federal funding and federal tax exemption, the USOC decided not to enter an American team in
the Moscow Games. The court found that, under IOC rules, the USOC has the exclusive and
discretionary authority to decide whether to enter a U.S. team in Olympic competition. Id. The
court held that, despite being federally chartered, the USOC is a private organization rather than
a state actor; therefore, its conduct is not subject to the constraints of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
Even if the USOC's decision constituted state action, athletes have no federal constitutional right
to participate in the Olympic Games. The Supreme Court subsequently confirmed that the USOC
is not a state actor. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522
(1987). Consistent therewith, courts have held that an NGB also is not a state actor. Behagen v.
Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S., 884 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1989).
105 In 1998, the original Amateur Sports Act was renamed the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur
Sports Act and, inter alia, amended to expressly provide that, although the USOC may sue and be
sued in federal court, nothing in the Act "shall create a private right of action." 36 U.S.C.
§220505(b)(9) (2006).
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private litigation against the USOC or an NGB. 10 6 As one Seventh Circuit
judge remarked, "there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal
courts for determining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the
eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games." 107
Consistent with this view, federal courts have ruled that the Amateur
Sports Act immunizes an NGB from antitrust liability for rules and decisions
that adversely affect an athlete's eligibility to participate in a protected
competition. In Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of United States,0 8 the
Tenth Circuit noted that the statute expressly authorizes only one NGB to
represent the United States within each IF and to recommend to the USOC
individual athletes and teams to represent the United States in the sports it
governs. It ruled that implied antitrust immunity is necessary because "[t]he
Act makes clear that Congress intended an NGB to exercise monolithic
control over its particular amateur sport, including coordinating with the
appropriate international sports federation and controlling amateur
eligibility for Americans that participate in sport."10 9
The Amateur Sports Act, which requires that all amateur athletes be
given an equal opportunity to participate in protected competitions without
discrimination, does not expressly nullify or supersede any applicable
federal civil rights statutes that protect Olympic sport athletes against
prohibited disability, 10 gender,"1 race,' 12 and religious discrimination. 13
However, even if an award of damages against the USOC or an NGB is an
appropriate remedy for civil rights violations, courts are reluctant to grant
106 See, e.g., Slaney v. IAAF, 244 F.3d 580 (2001). Courts also generally hold that athletes had no
private right of action under the Amateur Sports Act. See, e.g., Martinez v. U.S. Olympic Comm.,
802 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986); Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985);
Michels, 741 F.2d 155; Lee v. U.S. Taekwondo Union, 331 F. Supp.2d 1252 (D. Haw. 2004). But
see Sternberg v. USA Nat'l Karate-Do Fed'n, Inc., 123 F. Supp.2d 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that an athlete allegedly excluded from participating in a protected competition because of her
sex has an implied private right of action for damages against an NGB for violating the Stevens
Act's prohibition against gender discrimination).
107 Michels, 741 F.2d at 159 (Posner, J., concurring). See also Abdallah v. U.S. Ass'n of Taekwondo,
Inc., WL 2710489 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
108 Behagen, 884 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1989).
10' Id. at 529. See also JES Properties, Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., 458 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2006);
Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Texas State Soccer Ass'n, Inc., 213 F.3d 198 (Sth Cir. 2000).
110 Shepherd v. USOC, 464 F. Supp.2d 1072 (D. Colo. 2006), aff'd sub nom, Hollonbeck v. USOC,
513 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2008).
111 Sternberg, 123 F. Supp.2d 659.
112 Lee, 331 F. Supp.2d 1252.
113 Akiyama v. United States Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp.2d 1179 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
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requested injunctive relief that would interfere with the USOC's exclusive
jurisdiction regarding all matters regarding eligibility to participate in the
Olympics or other protected competitions.' 14
Courts have ruled that the Amateur Sports Act preempts state law
claims by athletes arising out of eligibility disputes regarding protected
competitions except for a breach of contract action to require the USOC or
an NBG to follow its own internal dispute resolution procedures.'11
American judges recognize the need for a uniform national procedure for
resolving athlete eligibility issues, which is necessary to further Congress'
"grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the USOC over all matters pertaining to
United States participation in the Olympic Games.""16 Thus, "only a very
specific claim will avoid the impediment to [a court's] subject matter
jurisdiction" established by the Amateur Sports Act." 7
In summary, courts hold that the Amateur Sports Act limits the nature
and scope of judicial authority in athlete eligibility disputes. The role of the
judicial system is to ensure that the USOC and NGBs follow their own rules
and provide a minimum level of procedural due process consistent with this
federal statute." 8 The merits of domestic disputes regarding a U.S. athlete's
114 See, e.g., Gatlin v. USADA, 2008 WL 2567657 (N.D. Fla. 2008); Lee, 331 F. Supp.2d at 1260, n.2.
As one court observed, although the Stevens Act requires the USOC and its NGBs to submit
unresolved eligibility disputes to binding arbitration, the statute does not require an athlete to
do so. Sternberg, 123 F. Supp. at 666. Although a court must give effect to both the Amateur
Sports Act and a federal civil rights statute if they can be reconciled, judicial application of a
federal civil rights law to resolve the merits of an eligibility dispute would conflict with the
Stevens Act's grant of exclusive authority to the USOC in such matters. Arbitration, not judicial
intervention, is the best means of finally resolving the merits of all athlete eligibility disputes in a
timely and efficient manner.
I's See Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating, 851 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Or. 1994) (vacated on other
grounds), 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995); Slaney, 244 F.3d 580 (2001).
116 Slaney, 244 F.3d at 595 (2001).
117 Id. at 595. In Harding, a federal district court held that judicial intervention in athlete
eligibility disputes "is appropriate only in the most extraordinary circumstances, where the
association has clearly breached its own rules, that breach will imminently result in serious and
irreparable harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has exhausted all internal remedies. Even then,
injunctive relief is limited to correcting the breach of the rules. The court should not intervene in
the merits of the underlying dispute." Harding, 851 F. Supp. at 1479.
118 The Stevens Act, in relevant part, provides: "In any lawsuit relating to the resolution of a
dispute involving the opportunity of an amateur athlete to participate in the Olympic Games, the
Paralympic Games, or the Pan-American Games, a court shall not grant injunctive relief against
[the USOCI within 21 days before the beginning of such games if [the USOC], after consultation
with the chair of the Athletes' Advisory Council, has provided a sworn statement in writing ... to
such court that its constitution and bylaws cannot provide for the resolution of such dispute
prior to the beginning of such games." 36 u.S.C. §220509(a). As one court observed, this
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eligibility to participate in the Olympic Games and other protected
competitions are to be resolved by AAA arbitration rather than by U.S.
courts.
i. AAA Arbitration
Article IX of the USOC Bylaws gives an athlete the right to submit to
binding AAA arbitration an eligibility dispute not resolved to his
satisfaction. The athlete must submit a list of persons that he believes may
be adversely affected by the arbitration (e.g., other athletes). 119 The AAA's
Commercial Arbitration Rules govern, with an expedited procedure
available to ensure that a timely award that will "do justice to the affected
parties" can be made. 20 The dispute, which is an arbitration proceeding
between the athlete and the NGB (the USOC receives notice but is not a
party), is resolved by a single impartial arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
with specialized expertise. 121 Like CAS arbitration, the AAA panel's review is
de novo, and the award must include findings of fact and conclusions of
law. 22
Because the American Arbitration Association is bound by
confidentiality obligations, historically it has not publicly released Article IX
arbitration awards. We are unable to draw any general conclusions from
such a limited sample, but some recent Article IX arbitration awards
obtained from sources other than the AAA123 illustrate that arbitration
panels have required both that athletes have a fair opportunity to qualify for
protected competitions 24 and that an NGB's selection procedures must be
statutory provision "is designed to prevent a court from usurping the USOC's powers when time
is too short for its own dispute-resolution machinery to do its work." Lindland v. USA Wrestling
Ass'n, 227 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000).
119 Bylaws of the USOC, art. IX, § 9.3. This provision was added after the conclusion of multiple
arbitration proceedings and subsequent litigation in Lindland, which illustrated the need for all
affected athletes to have a fair opportunity to be heard in a single arbitration. Lindland, 227 F.3d
1000 (2000).
120 American Arbitration Association Online Library, Sports Arbitration, Including Olympic
Athlete Disputes ("AAA Sports Arbitration"), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4135
(last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
121 Id.
122 Id. The arbitrator has no authority to review "the final decision of a referee during a
competition regarding a field of play decision," which may determine or materially influence
whether an athlete is selected to participate in a protected competition, unless it was outside the
referee's authority to make or was "the product of fraud, corruption, partiality, or other
misconduct." Bylaws of the USOC, supra note 85, § 9.12.
123 Copies of these awards are on file with the authors.
124 In the Matter of Arbitration between Sean Wolf and U.S. Rowing Association, Case No. 30 190
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fair, reasonable, and consistently applied to all athletes.
12s
ii. Judicial Review and Enforcement of AAA Awards
A court will provide only limited scrutiny of an AAA arbitration award
affecting an athlete's eligibility to participate in a sport, which is subject to
review and enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act.126 In Gault v.
United States Bobsled and Skeleton Federation, 2 7 a New York appellate court
explained:
Although we also may disagree with the arbitrator's award and find most
unfortunate the increasing frequency with which sporting events are
resolved in the courtroom, we have no authority to upset it when the
arbitrator did not exceed his authority. However, a court will vacate or refuse
00635 02 (AAA, August 9, 2002) (finding that the NGB had granted a waiver to another rower
who was unable to participate in one of the National Selection Regattas because he was taking a
law school exam, the arbitrator ruled that the NGB improperly refused to grant claimant a
waiver for a similar reason).
125 In the Matter of Arbitration between Rebecca Conzelman, Case No. 30 190 404 04 (AAA, April
6, 2004) (concluding that time standards used to select U.S. competitors for World Cup cycling
event have a rational basis and are valid).
There is a special arbitration process for resolving doping disputes that affect a U.S. athlete's
eligibility to participate in protected competitions. See generally Anne Benedetti & Jim Bunting,
There's a New Sheriff in Town: A Review of the United States Anti-doping Agency, 3 I.S.LR. 19
(2003); Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA Takes
Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DePaul J. Sports L. & contemp. Probs. 124
(2003). The United States Anti-Doping Agency ("USADA"), an independent anti-doping agency
for Olympic sports in the United States, provides drug education, conducts drug testing of
American athletes, investigates positive results, and recommends charges and sanctions for
violations of the World Anti-Doping Code or an IF's doping rules. See United States Anti-Doping
Agency, available at http://www.usantidoping.org/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). If a U.S. athlete is
dissatisfied with the USADA Review Board's proposed disposition of an alleged doping offense,
he or she may request a hearing before a single arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators who are
qualified as both AAA and North American CAS arbitrators. In this arbitration proceeding,
USADA and the athlete are adversarial parties. Special AAA Supplementary Procedures apply to
a USADA doping arbitration before the AAA/North American CAS panel. See Jacobs v. USA Track
& Field, 374 F.3d 85 (2d. Cir. 2004) (rejecting athlete's petition to compel arbitration pursuant to
AAA Commercial Rules). The arbitrators' decision is published and available on the USADA
website. An athlete may appeal an adverse AAA/North American CAS arbitration award to a
different panel of three CAS arbitrators, whose decision is final and binding. Although generally
not parties to USADA doping arbitrations, the USOC and U.S. NGBs effectively are bound by the
resulting awards pursuant to the Amateur Sports Act. Gahan v. U.S. Amateur Confederation of
Roller Skating, 382 F. Supp.2d 1127 (D. Neb. 2005).
1269 U.S.C. §1 et seq.
127 Gault v. U.S. Bobsled and Skeleton Fed'n, 578 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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to confirm an arbitration award that is the result of "corruption," "fraud,"
"evident partiality," or any similar bar to confirmation.128
3. Analysis and Conclusions
The Amateur Sports Act has several requirements that give U.S. athletes
a voice and voting power regarding the domestic regulation of Olympic
sports. To ensure that their interests are adequately represented, athletes
are entitled to have at least twenty percent of the voting power held by the
USOC's Board of Directors and committees as well as each NGB. An Athletes'
Advisory Council, whose members are elected by Olympic athletes,
maintains an open line of communication with the USOC and provides input
on their behalf.
The Amateur Sports Act also establishes some important procedural
safeguards and substantive protections against discrimination to protect
U.S. athletes' opportunities to participate in (and qualify for) Olympic and
other protected international amateur sports competitions. There is an
athlete ombudsman who provides independent, free advice to athletes
concerning eligibility participation disputes. Although there is no U.S.
constitutional or Amateur Sports Act right to participate in the Olympic
Games or other protected competitions, Article IX of the USOC's bylaws
requires the USOC to investigate and attempt to promptly resolve an NGB's
alleged denial of an amateur athlete's opportunity to participate in
protected competitions. If dissatisfied with the USOC's proposed resolution,
an athlete has the right to submit the dispute to final and binding AAA
arbitration.
The AAA arbitration process enables impartial arbitrators with legal
training and knowledge of the subject sport to resolve athlete eligibility
disputes promptly. All athletes who may be affected by the AAA award have
an opportunity to participate in the arbitration proceeding. The arbitrator
conducts a de novo review of the dispute, and the award, which is binding
on the NGB and USOC, must include findings of fact and conclusions of law.
However, because AAA does not make Article IX awards publicly available,
we are unable to express a definitive opinion whether this arbitration
process effectively protects athletes' participation opportunities.
Courts have a very limited role in resolving athlete eligibility disputes.
Although a court will not resolve the merits of the dispute, it will ensure that
the USOC and NGBs follow their own rules and provide an athlete with the
procedural due process protections required by the Amateur Sports Act and
128 Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1003.
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the USOC Bylaws. A court also will provide limited scrutiny of an AAA
athlete eligibility award to ensure that the arbitrator did not exceed his or
her authority and that it is not the product of corruption or bias.
I. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: THE PRIMACY OF CONTRACT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Unionized professional athletes have an effective voice in the
promulgation of athlete eligibility requirements. 129 In addition, de novo
arbitration before independent arbitrators with specialized sports law
expertise often is used to resolve athlete eligibility disputes arising in
unionized professional team sports. Otherwise, the legal framework
governing athlete eligibility issues and disputes arising in the U.S.
professional sports industries130 differs significantly from those for Olympic
sports and other worldwide athletic competitions.
For most professional athletes, playing a sport is their primary
occupation and source of income. In team sports, professional athletes
generally are employees of their respective clubs who are paid an agreed
salary, which is a multi-million dollar amount for most National Football
League ("NFL"), Major League Baseball ("MLB"), National Basketball
Association ("NBA"), and National Hockey League ("NHL") players.'3 '
129 In the major United States professional sports leagues (e.g., Major League Baseball ("MLB"),
National Basketball Association ("NBA"), National Hockey League ("NHL"), National Football
League ("NFL"), and Major League Soccer ("MLS")), players' unions represent athletes and
possess exclusive authority to negotiate on behalf of athletes over terms and conditions of
employment such as minimum salaries, pension benefits, playing conditions, eligibility rules, and
grievance procedures. See Mitten et al., supra note 3, at 711. Negotiations between players'
representatives and management representatives result in collective bargaining agreements.
130 Professional team and individual performer sports are a very popular form of entertainment
in the United States. The producers of professional sporting events such as sports leagues and
other organizations have strong market incentives to create a brand of athletic competition that
attracts elite, highly skilled athletes; is commercially appealing to the public; and is profitable.
Major professional team sports such as the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL, as well as individual
performer professional sports such as golf and tennis, collectively attract millions of event
attendees and viewers and generate billions of revenues annually.
131 For MLB the 2006 average player salary was $2.699 million and the minimum salary was
$380,000. See mlbplayers.com, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#average (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). For the NBA
the 2006-07 average player salary was $5.215 million, and the minimum salary was $412,718.
See Larry Coon, NBA Salary Cap FAQ, http://members.cox.net/Imcoon/salarycap.htm (last
visited Oct. 29, 2008); InsideHoops.com, NBA Minimum Salary,
http://www.insidehoods.com/minimum-nba-salary.shtm (last visited Oct. 27, 2008). For the
NFL the average player salary in 2006 was $1.4 million, and the minimum player salary was
$285,000. See Larry Weisman, Expect NFL Salary Cap to Keep Going Through the Roof, USA
Today, Jul. 7, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2006-07-07-
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Professional athletes who participate in individual sports such as golf and
tennis usually are independent contractors who must satisfy the event
organizer's qualifying criteria in order to participate in organized
competitions. Their compensation is based on their respective individual
performances in competitions.
In professional sports, the legal framework establishing the parameters
of permissible athlete eligibility requirements and protecting an athlete's
opportunity to participate is a mix of contract, labor, antitrust, and civil
rights laws. In general, the legal relationship between a producer of
professional sports competition and an athlete is established by the terms of
their contract, with state contract law and federal labor, antitrust, and civil
rights law limiting its boundaries. United States professional sports leagues
and governing bodies are private entities that are not subject to the
constraints of the United States Constitution; 1 3 therefore, they are not
obliged to comply with, for example, the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. The Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause 133 precludes direct
state regulation (other than by contract law) of the legal relationship
between a professional athlete and a national or multi-state professional
sports league or governing body.134
To satisfy public demand for competition among a sport's best athletes,
producers and organizers of professional sports events have a strong
economic incentive not to base eligibility requirements on factors other
than an athlete's ability, skill, or proficiency. Historically, however, athletes
salary-report x.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); asktheCommish.com, Salary Cap FAQ,
http://askthecommish.com/salarycap/faq.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). For the NHL, the
2005-06 average player salary was $1.28 million, and the minimum player salary was $450,000.
See NHL.com, Collective Bargaining FAQs, http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cba/index.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007). See generally The Hockey News, Salaries,
http://www.thehockeynews.com/salaries/team-listing.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
132 See, e.g., Long v. Nat'l Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101, 105 (W.D. Pa. 1994), afr'd, 66 F.3d
311 (3d Cir. 1994).
133 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies § 5.3 (Aspen
Publishers 2d. ed. 2002); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law §
8.1 (West 2d ed. 2005).
134 See, e.g., Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 677 (Cal. 1983). An early
case, Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), held that state human
or civil rights laws such as those prohibiting disability discrimination can be applied to multi-
state professional sports leagues. Today, a disability discrimination claim by a professional
athlete against an interstate professional sport league or association is likely to be brought
under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661
(2001).
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with the requisite talents were denied an opportunity to participate in most
professional sports solely because of their race or ethnicity. For example, for
many years during the twentieth century, African-American, 35 Native
American,' 36  and Latino-American 137  athletes were excluded from
professional sports. Such blatant discrimination is now clearly prohibited by
federal civil rights laws,' 38 and today a majority of professional football and
basketball players are African-American.
39
A. Team Sports
1. Initial Eligibility Requirements
In the past, professional team sport athletes successfully challenged on
antitrust grounds league-wide eligibility requirements (other than
medical/physical fitness requirements)140 that prevented member clubs
from employing them. For example, courts have enjoined a professional
sports league from enforcing eligibility rules requiring that a prospective
player attain a minimum age or that a specified number of years have
elapsed from his high school graduation; these rules were found to
unreasonably restrain trade in the market for player services.1
41
135 See generally William C. Rhoden, Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption
of the Black Athlete (Crown Publishers 2006); Kenneth L. Shropshire, In Black and White: Race
and Sports in America (New York University Press 1996); Arthur Ashe, A Hard Road to Glory: A
History of the African-American Athlete Since 1946 (Warner Books 1988).
136 Sally Jenkins, The Team That Invented Football, Sports Illustrated, Apr. 23, 2007, at 60.
137 Latinos endured a double standard. During major league baseball's period of segregation,
fair-skinned Latinos were permitted to play, while those with dark skin were not. Timothy Davis,
Breaking the Color Barrier, in Courting the Yankees (Ettie Ward ed., Carolina Academic Press
2003), at 335, 339
13a Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2006); See Title VII, Civil Rights
Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)-4 (2006).
139 Mitten, et al., supra note 3, at 741-42.
140 See, e.g., Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (upholding
league rule prohibiting one-eyed player from playing for member clubs because its primary
purpose and effect is to promote safety and has de minimis anticompetitive effect).
141 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Linseman v.
World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Boris v. U.S. Football League,
No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) (holding that league rule
requiring player to exhaust college football eligibility or to earn college diploma or that at least
five years elapse since he entered college unreasonably restrains trade). Other courts have
enjoined a league and its member clubs from collectively refusing to employ players who
formerly played for a defunct rival league. See Bowman v. Nat'l Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754
(D. Minn. 1975). Cf. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d. Cir. 1949) (holding that an alleged
agreement among "organized baseball" clubs in United States not to employ player who played
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In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,142 the court granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of a bylaw preventing a person
from playing in the NBA until four years after he graduated from high school
based on its finding of a substantial probability that the bylaw violated
federal antitrust laws. Because it was undisputed that the plaintiff was well-
qualified to play NBA basketball, the court observed that the challenged
bylaw "is an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon the rights of
[Spencer] Haywood and other potential NBA players to contract to play for
NBA teams until the happening of an event ... fixed by the NBA without the
consent or agreement of such potential player. 143 Recognizing that
professional basketball players generally have short careers, the court
concluded that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if he was unable to
play NBA basketball immediately because his physical condition and skills
would deteriorate without high level competition. Consequently, a
substantial part of his playing career would be lost.
Similarly, in Linseman v. World Hockey Association, the court found that
"the loss of even one year of playing time is very detrimental."144 It
preliminarily enjoined the World Hockey Association from enforcing a rule
prohibiting its clubs from drafting players who were not at least twenty
years old. Characterizing the rule as "a blanket restriction as to age without
any consideration of talent,"141 the court found "no need for concerted
action as to which specific players will be employed," because the
"determination, under our free market system, ought to be left up to each
individual team."'146
It is significant that the player eligibility requirements successfully
challenged in Denver Rockets and Linseman were unilaterally established by
a league and its member clubs. These rules were not agreed to by a union
representing the league's players during collective bargaining negotiations.
Currently, MLB, NFL, NBA, NHL, and Major League Soccer ("MLS") players
are unionized. Their respective unions have both the exclusive authority to
represent all players in collective bargaining negotiations with the leagues
professionally in Mexico contrary to reserve clause states antitrust claim because conduct
"unreasonably forbids any one to practice his calling").
142 325 F. Supp. 1049 (1971).
143 Id. at 1056. But see discussion of a collective bargaining agreement's effect on the legality of
age restrictions infra note 173 and accompanying text.
14 Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1319.
145 Id. at 1323.
146 Id. at 1321.
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and a duty to do so fairly.147 All current and prospective players are bound
by the terms of the union's collective bargaining agreement with the league,
which has led to litigation by some players not yet members of the union
who have asserted that the union did not adequately protect their interests
by agreeing to terms that harmed them.148
In Clarett v. National Football League,149 the Second Circuit held that the
non-statutory labor exemption immunizes from antitrust scrutiny player
eligibility requirements that are the product of a lawful collective bargaining
process. Claiming an antitrust violation, Maurice Clarett, a star football
player in his sophomore year at Ohio State University, challenged an NFL
rule stipulating that players are eligible to be drafted only if "three full
college seasons have elapsed since their high school graduation." 1so
The Second Circuit ruled that the union has the exclusive authority to
negotiate the terms and conditions of prospective NFL players' employment.
Eligibility rules are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining between
the league and the players' union because they pertain to players' "wages,
hours, or terms and conditions of employment."' 5'1 As part of its effort to
obtain a collective bargaining agreement providing the best overall deal for
all NFL players, federal labor law gives the union "the ability to advantage
certain categories of players over others, subject . . . to [its] duty of fair
representation."'152 For example, the union may "favor veteran players over
rookies . . . and can seek to preserve jobs for current players to the
detriment of new employees and the exclusion of outsiders."'
Although the eligibility rule temporarily excluded Clarett from the NFL
regardless of his ability and readiness to play professional football, the
Second Circuit held that "the NFL and its players' union can agree that an
employee will not be hired or considered for employment for nearly any
reason whatsoever so long as they do not violate federal laws such as those
prohibiting unfair labor practices ... or discrimination..1..,,54
Clarett, although binding precedent only in the Second Circuit, 55 is
147 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroads, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
148 See, e.g., Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
149 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005).
150 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128.
11 Id. at 132.
152 Id. at 139.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 141.
ss Nevertheless, so far it is being followed by other circuit courts. See, e.g., Nat'l Hockey League
Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462,474 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Clarett,
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consistent with general labor law principles providing a union with
exclusive and plenary authority to negotiate all terms and conditions of its
members' employment, including restrictions and limits favoring existing
workers over those initially seeking to work for a unionized employer.15 6 It
also is consistent with Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,15 7 in which the Supreme
Court held that the non-statutory labor exemption bars an antitrust
challenge to an employment term that is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining - even by players who are not currently eligible for membership
in the union. In other words, antitrust liability cannot be imposed for
agreements or conduct that is permitted by federal labor law. In addition,
Clarett follows Second Circuit precedent that broadly construes the scope of
the non-statutory labor exemption as applied to professional sports.158
On the other hand, Clarett fails to consider that there is only one major
professional league (i.e., source of employment) for each sport in the United
States. Because football, basketball, hockey, baseball, and soccer each have
only one major U.S. professional league, blanket eligibility requirements
wholly unrelated to individual skill and ability may have much greater
exclusionary and economically detrimental effects on team sport
professional athletes than those on employees in other industries. For
example, electricians, plumbers, and carpenters have the option of seeking
employment with non-union employers. Other courts, including the Clarett
district court,159 have recognized that professional athletes may not have
any alternative employment that is a reasonable substitute for a U.S. major
professional sports league.160 Because most professional athletes have very
short playing careers, even short-term league-wide exclusion for reasons
369 F.3d 124, with approval).
156 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989);
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
u.s. 330 (1953).
157 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
158 See Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995); NBA v. Williams, 45
F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). See also Zimmerman v. Nat'l
Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D.D.C 1986) ("Not only present but potential future
players for a professional sports league are parties to the bargaining relationship."). In contrast,
the Clarett district court relied on Eighth Circuit authority, Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), adopted by two other circuits, in ruling that the NFL's draft eligibility requirement is not
immune from antitrust scrutiny. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379,391 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
159 "[Tjhe NFL represents an unparalleled opportunity for an aspiring football player in terms of
salary, publicity, endorsement opportunities, and level of competition." Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d
at 384.
160 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1053; Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1319.
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not reasonably related to individual skill and ability or health and safety
may cause irreparable harm to athletes' ability to use and develop their
unique talents.' 6 '
On the other hand, however, in the future, due to the increasing
globalization of sports labor markets, major league professional sports
employment options may be more readily available (e.g., European
basketball for U.S. athletes who do meet the NBA's minimum age
requirements).
In Brown, the Supreme Court conceded that professional athletes, unlike
most unionized workers, often have unique individualized talents and skills.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to characterize professional sports as
"special in respect to labor law's antitrust exemption"'162 or to provide
professional athletes with an antitrust remedy not available to employees in
other industries. Thus, athletes excluded from participating in unionized
professional sports generally are limited to labor and civil rights law
remedies, 63 which may not adequately protect their athletic participation
interests in individual circumstances.
A labor union has a duty to fairly represent all current and prospective
players, but only conduct that is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith"
breaches this duty.164 In Air Line Pilots Association International v. O'Neill,
the Court held that this standard applies to the collective bargaining process
and explained:
Congress did not intend judicial review of a union's performance to permit
161 For example, Maurice Clarett, despite being drafted in the third round of the 2005 NFL draft
by the Denver Broncos, was unable to make the club. Denver Done With Clarett; Broncos Cut
Ties With Ex-Ohio State RB; Their 3rd-round Pick, Chi. Trib., Aug. 29, 2005, at 6. Being ineligible
to play NFL football during the 2004 season (combined with his suspension that precluded him
from playing college football for Ohio State during the 2003 season) likely caused his playing
skills to deteriorate significantly, with corresponding irreparable harm to his once-promising
potential career as an NFL player. Clarett currently is serving a prison term for armed robbery.
See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1057 (finding player will suffer irreparable injury from being
excluded from NBA for one year because "a substantial part of his playing career will have been
dissipated, his physical condition, skills and coordination will deteriorate from lack of high level
competition.").
162 Brown, 518 U.S. at 248 (1996).
163 However, a player may have an antitrust remedy if it he can satisfy the difficult burden of
proving that a professional league's minimum age limits or de facto equivalents are the product
of conspiracy with an economically interested third party not part of the collective bargaining
relationship, such as the NCAA. Boris, 1984 WL 894 at *3; Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063-
64; See also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1320.
16 Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985).
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the court to substitute its own view of the proper bargain for that reached by
the union. Rather, Congress envisioned the relationship between the courts
and labor unions as similar to that between the courts and the legislature.
Any substantive examination of a union's performance, therefore, must be
highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need for the
effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities.... For that reason,
the final product of the bargaining process may constitute evidence of a
breach of duty only if it can be fairly characterized as so far outside a "wide
range of reasonableness." 165
In determining employment eligibility, the union has a duty not to agree
to arbitrary or irrational terms that constitute "invidious" discrimination
against some individuals it represents. 166 An exclusionary eligibility
requirement does not breach a union's duty of fair representation unless it
discriminates illegally against a protected class. For example, collective
bargaining terms allowing exclusion from employment based on one's race
violate this union duty.167 On the other hand, labor law precedent permits a
union to agree to seniority-based employment eligibility preferences. 68
Because professional athletes have different playing skills and
experience and compete among themselves for a limited number of jobs, a
players' union needs wide latitude in determining how to further the
players' collective best interests. Agreeing to initial employment eligibility
requirements based on a prospective player's minimum age or the passage
of a particular period of time, as a method of allocating a limited number of
jobs in a professional sports league, does not violate the union's duty of fair
representation. In Clarett, the Second Circuit, applying well-established
labor law principles, observed that the union "may, for example, favor
veteran players over rookies ... and can seek to preserve jobs for current
players to the detriment of new employees and the exclusion of
outsiders."169
Under existing law, a minimum age eligibility rule (or a de facto
equivalent) for professional athletes is not a form of prohibited
discrimination that breaches a players' union's duty of fair representation.
165 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991).
166 Id. at 79-82.
167 Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 73-
78 (summarizing judicial development of labor union duty to represent all members' interests
without hostility or discrimination).
168 Air Line PilotsAss'n, 499 U.S. 65; Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. 330; Local 357, Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of American v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
169 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
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The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") 170
protects only persons who are at least forty years old. Although the ADEA
"forbids discriminatory preference for the young over the old," it does not
prohibit "favoring the old over the young." 71 Therefore, although eligibility
rules categorically exclude young athletes for reasons unrelated to their
individual talent, skills, and maturity, these rules do not violate federal labor
or civil rights laws.
In some individual cases, league-wide minimum age rules or their
functional equivalent appear unfair and arbitrary when applied to
extraordinarily talented young athletes who have both the physical skills
and maturity to play a major professional sport. They may have no other
options to participate in a sport at a comparable level of competition and no
effective means of legal redress under current law.172 On the other hand, a
minimum age eligibility requirement is only a temporal limitation or
restriction. Such eligibility restrictions exclude relatively few athletes
having the requisite current ability and skills to play a professional sport. All
things considered, the establishment of threshold eligibility standards by
collective bargaining between the players' union and league representatives
(the parties that are most knowledgeable about the relevant factors to
consider) is superior to case-by-case antitrust adjudication by non-expert
courts, which only have authority to invalidate player eligibility rules found
to be unreasonable rather than to establish "reasonable" eligibility rules.
2. Disciplinary Sanctions Affecting Athlete Eligibility and Dispute
Resolution Process
Disciplinary sanctions adversely affecting a player's current or future
eligibility to participate (usually with corresponding economic
consequences) are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining in unionized
professional sports. Thus, the players' union is empowered to protect the
players' participation interests by negotiating the conduct subject to
discipline, sanctions for violations, and grievance mechanisms. In most
instances the union is able to limit the otherwise broad authority of a club
or league commissioner to discipline players 173 through effective use of the
170 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
171 General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004). See also Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 214 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. 1974).
172 See supra notes 159, 160 and accompanying text
173 Absent limits imposed by the collective bargaining agreement, courts generally provide a
professional sports league and its clubs with substantial discretion to impose player discipline
and are very deferential to their decisions. See, e.g., Molinas v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp.
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collective bargaining process. There generally is a collectively bargained
range of disciplinary sanctions for on-field or off-field player misconduct
that violates league or club rules promulgated to: maintain competitive
balance (e.g., doping, corked bats); preserve the sport's integrity (e.g.,
gambling, doping); maintain the sport's public image (e.g., criminal conduct,
domestic violence, doping); protect player health and safety (e.g., violence
injuring opposing player, doping); and ensure team unity and appropriate
decorum.
Currently, most disputes regarding player discipline imposed by the
league or a member club are resolved by an impartial arbitrator mutually
selected by the union and league representatives. 174 The union files a
grievance on the player's behalf and represents him in the arbitration
proceeding. It is not uncommon for an arbitrator to reduce the length of a
player's disciplinary suspension for misconduct that initially was imposed
by league or club officials. 175 Even if his disciplinary sanction is upheld by an
arbitrator, a player has had a fair opportunity to be heard as well as the
advantages of other procedural safeguards to protect his future opportunity
to participate in the sport. The arbitrator's decision is final and binding, and
it will be judicially invalidated only on very narrow grounds. 7 6
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (upholding indefinite suspension of player for admittedly gambling on his
team's games in violation of his contract and league rules).
174 A notable exception is the NFL Conduct Policy, which was established in April 2007, after
input from NFL Players Association Executive Director Gene Upshaw and the NFL Player
Advisory Council. The Policy gives NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell broad unilateral discretion
to discipline NFL players for off-field violent and/or criminal conduct that is not subject to
external review. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, Player Policies, Conduct Policy,
http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181&1mid=336&pid=0&type=n (last
visited Oct. 29, 2008).
175 See, e.g., NBA Players Ass'n on Behalf of Player Latrell Sprewell and Warriors Basketball Club
and NBA Arbitration Decision in Mitten et al., supra note 3, at 638. See also Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n v. Comm'r (John Rocker), 638 PLI/PAT 765 (Feb. 2001) (Manfred, Arb.).
But see Terrell Owens v. Philadelphia Eagles (Nov. 18, 2005) (Bloch, Arb.) available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2234819&type=story (last visited Oct. 29, 2008)
(finding club authority to suspend player without pay for conduct detrimental to team for
maximum of four weeks under CBA, but that coach had discretion not to permit him to play or
practice thereafter, because his misconduct posed a destructive and continuing threat to team).
176 See, e.g., Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); Sprewell v.
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979,986 (9th Cir. 2001).
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B. Individual Performer Sports
1. Initial Eligibility Requirements
Those who participate in professional individual performer sports, such
as golf, swimming, and track and field, generally are independent
contractors who must satisfy a governing body's eligibility criteria and
performance standards in order to participate in a competition. Because
these athletes are not employees, there is no union to collectively bargain on
their behalf.177 In most instances the sport's governing authority or the
event organizer unilaterally establishes the conditions of participation. To
maximize an individual performer sport's commercial appeal to fans an
spectators, an independent sports governing authority has a strong
economic incentive to encourage and permit participation by the most
highly skilled athletes without discriminating based on non-performance
related factors.178 Absent violation of an athlete's federal or state civil
rights, 179 courts generally are reluctant to invalidate athlete eligibility rules
established by an independent sports governing body or event organizer. 18 0
177 As a result, minimum age requirements are potentially subject to antitrust challenge. For
example, the Ladies Professional Golf Association's requires players to be at least eighteen years
old, but underage players may apply for a waiver. See also Joe Menzer, Feelings Mixed on Talk of
Raising Age Requirement, NASCAR.com, Jan. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.nascar.com/2008/news/headlines/cup/01/24/gibbs.minimum.age/index.html
(NASCAR is considering raising the minimum age requirement from eighteen to twenty-one for
drivers in the Sprint Cup Series).
178 Nevertheless, in some instances such discrimination has occurred. For example, the
Professional Golfers Association formerly had a "whites only" provision, which prevented
minorities from participating in its golf tournaments. Arthur Ashe, A Hard Road to Glory: A
History of the African American Athlete 1919-1945 at 69 (Warner Books 1988) (commenting on
informal PGA policy of excluding blacks from tour stops); Stanley Mosk, My Shot: The Tour's
Fear of Carts is the Same Form of Bigotry That Caused the Caucasian-only Clause, SI.com, (June 5,
2001), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/golf/news/2001/06/05/my-shot/ (last
visited Oct. 29, 2008) (commenting on the same).
179 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (holding that ADA requires PGA Tour to
permit physically impaired professional golfer to use cart to enable him to compete in its
tournaments); Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (issuing
preliminary injunction to enable transsexual to qualify to participate in the United States Open
Tennis Tournament based on plaintiff's likely success in proving that use of Barr body test as
sole criterion of gender violates New York's Human Rights Law).
180 See, e.g., Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc, 201 F. Supp.2d 1106, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting
antitrust challenge to Senior PGA Tour's per-event limit of seventy-eight golfers and its eligibility
rules limiting the ability of new and non-exempt players to compete in its events because "[t]he
Tour provides an entertainment product in which primarily well known and popular senior
golfers may compete against one another").
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For example, it is permissible to adopt non-discriminatory, unbiased
eligibility rules or methods for evaluating an athlete's playing ability and
skills.181
2. Disciplinary Sanctions Affecting Athlete Eligibility and Dispute Resolution
Process
Because individual performer professional sports are not unionized,
there is no collectively bargained disciplinary process and range of
sanctions. Today, in most instances, player discipline for violations of the
sport's rules, including suspension from competition, is imposed by an
independent commissioner or governing authority. Under contract or
private association law, courts will provide limited judicial review to ensure
that an appropriate level of procedural process is provided, contract rights
are respected, and decisions are not made in bad faith.18 2
C. Analysis and Conclusions
Unlike the Amateur Sports Act, which safeguards the opportunity of all
U.S. athletes to qualify for and participate in the Olympic Games and other
protected international sports competitions, there is no comparable federal
law that directly regulates professional sports leagues and governing bodies
and protects professional athletes. But professional athletes are covered by
federal civil rights statutes, which prohibit discrimination based on "race,
color, or national origin." 8 3 Federal labor law also provides the basis for
collectively bargained contractual provisions (and eligibility dispute
resolution procedures) that both define and protect unionized professional
athletes' athletic participation opportunities.
Like Olympic athletes, professional athletes have no athletic
participation "rights" absent those established by contract or applicable
federal civil or human rights laws. Through the collective bargaining
process, unionized professional athletes have the ability to negotiate initial
eligibility requirements, limits on league and club disciplinary authority,
181 Deesen v. Prof'l Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
182 See, e.g., Crouch v. NASCAR, 845 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1988); Koszela v. NASCAR, 646 F.2d 749
(2d. Cir. 1981). But see Blalock v. Ladies Prof'l Golfers Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(finding that golfer's one-year suspension imposed with "completely unfettered, subjective
discretion" by a group of her competitors violates the antitrust laws). In some situations (e.g.,
doping offenses), an individual sport athlete may have a contractual right to have an
independent arbitrator review a decision by the sport's governing authority that adversely
affects his eligibility to compete. See supra note 125 and accompanying text
183 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq. (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (2006).
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and a dispute resolution process that adequately protects their athletic
participation interests. Except when collectively bargained initial eligibility
rules temporarily preclude athletes such as Maurice Clarett from
participating, professional team sport athletes have legal protections
equivalent to, and in some instances, greater than those available to Olympic
athletes.
By contrast, unlike unionized professional team sport athletes,
individual performer sport athletes are unable to engage in arms-length
negotiation of eligibility requirements. However, the sport's independent
promoter or governing body has a strong profit motive to produce a
commercially viable form of athletic competition attractive to fans, which
provides an economic incentive not to unduly restrict athletic participation
opportunities. Because of limited judicial precedent, it is unclear whether
the federal antitrust laws adequately protect participation opportunities for
individual performer sport athletes, although the threat of antitrust
litigation by an excluded athlete creates a similar incentive. Courts
appropriately recognize the legitimate regulatory and disciplinary authority
of independent sport governing bodies and promoters, but they should
ensure that athlete eligibility rules and their application in specific
situations further legitimate objectives without unnecessarily excluding or
limiting athletic participation opportunities.
II. INTERSCHOLASTIC AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC COMPETITION: JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE TO THE "GOLDEN RULE"
A. Individual and Societal Benefits of Participation in High School and
College Sports
Competing in athletics in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics
provides a unique educational experience with a significant potential to
positively shape several aspects of a student-athlete's academic, personal,
and professional life. Some of the most important traits and skills athletic
competition develops are motivation, self-esteem, a strong work ethic,
discipline, and the ability to work in a team environment, all of which are
important factors in determining one's academic and career success. Former
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White, who played college football as a
student at the University of Colorado and finished second in the 1937
Heisman Trophy voting, said that
Sports and other forms of vigorous physical activity provide educational
experience which cannot be duplicated in the classroom. They are an
uncompromising laboratory in which we must think and act quickly and
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efficiently under pressure and then force us to meet our own inadequacies
face-to-face and to do something about them, as nothing else does.... Sports
resemble life in capsule form and the participant quickly learns that his
performance depends upon the development of strength, stamina, self-
discipline and a sure and steady judgment. 184
Others have similar views. The Duke of Wellington claimed that "[t]he
Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eaton."185 Sarah Palin,
Alaska's first female governor and the 2008 Republican candidate for vice
president, said, "Everything I need to know, I learned on the basketball
court."
186
In our increasingly technology-driven, isolated society,187 participation
in interscholastic athletics provides a means of establishing social networks
with one's peers and developing a community-based identity with
corresponding positive academic effects. Finding a link between high school
students' sense of identity, patterns of extracurricular involvement, and
indicators of successful and risky adolescent development, a 1999 study
found that female and male students who participate in high school team
sports through the twelfth grade have a school-based identity that
correlates to positive academic performance (e.g., an increased twelfth-
grade GPA and an increased probability of being enrolled in college full-time
at age twenty-one) 188 This highly positive finding is consistent with prior
research evidencing that sports participation, relative to participation in
other extracurricular activities such as student government and academic
clubs, is "linked to lower likelihood of school dropout and higher rates of
college attendance." 18 9
For many, participating in high school and college sports provides an
otherwise unavailable opportunity during one's teenage and early adult
184 John M. Barron et. al., The Effects of High School Athletic Participation on Education and
Labor Market Outcomes, 82 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 409, 409 (Aug. 2000).
105 Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 371 (Little Brown, 15th ed. 1980).
186 Kathy Kiely, Alaska's New-Style Governor Already Shaking Things Up, USA TODAY, Jan. 4,
2007, at 6A.
187 See generally Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (Simon & Schuster 2000); M. McPherson, L. Smith-Lovin, & M. Brashears, Social
Isolation in America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks Over Two Decades, 71 Amer. Soc.
Rev. 353 (June 2006).
188 Jacquelynne S. Eccles & Bonnie L. Barber, Student Council, Volunteering, Basketball, or
Marching Band: What Kind of Extracurricular Involvement Matters?,14 J. Adolescent Res. 10
(1999). On the other hand, participation in team sports also was linked to the risky behavior of
drinking alcohol.
189 Id. at 12.
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years to learn positive values and to develop the skills necessary to pursue a
better future and a successful life. For example, the determination and
persistence developed through his participation in organized sports enabled
Troy Smith to avoid the serious troubles encountered by his boyhood peers,
earn a degree from Ohio State University, and win the 2006 Heisman
Trophy. 90 Similarly, the opportunity to participate in high school football
gave New Orleans students a sense of hope and a respite from the
disruption of their lives and destruction of their homes caused by Hurricane
Katrina.' 9' A 2004 Women's Sports Foundation Report references several
studies evidencing that girls' participation in high school sports results in
better health and grades, greater commitment to academic endeavors, lower
rates of absenteeism and dropout, fewer disciplinary problems, and an
increased interest in attending college.192
Several recent empirical studies by economists demonstrate that both
African-American and white males who participate in high school athletics
generally earn more after graduation than those who do not participate.1
93
In the aggregate, this research provides strong support that male
participation in athletics generally reduces the likelihood of dropping out of
high school, increases the likelihood of attaining a higher level of education,
and provides an opportunity to acquire and develop skills valued by labor
markets. One study concludes that "athletic participation contributes to
productivity beyond that of other extracurricular activities; wages are
higher by between [4.2 percent and 14.8 percent] if athletic participation in
high school is chosen in place of other extracurricular activities."194 Another
190 Pat Forde, Smith, Mom to Share Heartwarming Moment of Triumph, ESPN.com, Dec. 7, 2006,
available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2689611&type=story (last visited Oct 29,
2008).
191 Neal Thompson, Hurricane Season, Sports Illus., July 23, 2007, at 59.
192 Women's Sports Foundation, The Women's Sports Foundation Report: Her Life Depends On
It: Sport, Physical Activity and the Health and Well-Being of American Girls, at 30-31 (2004),
available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/binary-
data/WSF ARTICLE/pdf file/990.pdf (last visited Oct 29, 2008).
193 Barron, supra note 184; Eric R. Eide & Nick Ronan, Is Participation in High School Athletics an
Investment or a Consumption Good? Evidence from High School and Beyond, 20 Econ. Educ. Rev.
431 (2001); B. Ewing, High School Athletics and the Wages of Black Males, 24 Rev. Black Pol.
Econ. 67 (Summer 1995); Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman, Social Isolation and Inequality,
3 J. Econ. Inequality 243 (Oct 2005).
194 Barron, supra note 184, at 421. Postlewaite & Silverman found empirical evidence to support
their thesis that participation in high school athletics "leads to the accumulation of skills valued
in the labor market," resulting in an eighteen percent wage premium that "is largely not
attributable to the crowding out of activities that have negative long-term effects on later
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study concludes that male high school athletes "are significantly less likely
to skip school, have unprotected sex, use marijuana or other drugs, be
charged with a crime, watch television or smoke cigarettes." 19s
Participation in intercollegiate athletics provides student-athletes with
the opportunity to experience similar academic and future career benefits.
As articulated by Myles Brand, President of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA"):
Participation in athletics has educational developmental value. Student-
athletes learn to strive for excellence, to work hard and to work in teams, to
be resilient and to persist. A college education should do more than increase
disciplinary learning through lectures and textbooks; it also should develop
in students the values and character necessary for a successful life and for
good citizenship. Participation in college athletics is one very good means to
meet these developmental needs.196
Analysis of data from a 2007 National Collegiate Athletic Association
study of 8,000 former student-athletes reveals that eighty-eight percent of
student-athletes earn their baccalaureate degrees (compared to less than
twenty-five percent of the American adult population); ninety-one percent
of former Division 1 student-athletes are employed full-time (eleven
percent more than the general population); and twenty-seven percent of
former Division 1 student-athletes earn a postgraduate degree.197 These
findings are consistent with other empirical studies finding that former
male student-athletes earn higher annual incomes on average than
otherwise similar non-athletes.198 As Peyton Manning, a current NFL
quarterback and former University of Tennessee student-athlete, states,
"The reality is that collegiate sports have a lot more to do with learning than
they do with winning. As student-athletes, we learn more than most people.
. . the blessings of . . . camaraderie and shared sacrifice, collective
responsibility and commitment to excellence, and time management and life
management."199
wages." Postlewaite & Silverman, supra note 193, at 250, 252.
19s Postlewaite & Silverman, supra note 193, at 250.
196 Myles Brand, Money Not Corruptive If Actions Uphold Collegiate Mission, The NCAA News,
Apr. 25, 2005, at 4.
197 Gary T. Brown, Research Validates Value and Values, of Athletics, The NCAA News, Feb. 12,
2007, at 1.
198 Daniel J. Henderson, etal., Do Former College Athletes Earn More at Work, 41 1. Hum.
Resources 558 (2006); James E. Long & Steven B. Caudill, The Impact of Participation in
Intercollegiate Athletics on Income and Graduation, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 525 (1991).
199 Letter from Myles Brand, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association, to Honorable
115
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B. The "Golden Rule" and the Limited Applicability and Effectiveness of
Public Laws
At both the high school and college levels, athlete eligibility rules are
adopted, interpreted, and enforced by a state governing body for
interscholastic athletics or a national association for intercollegiate athletics
(e.g., the NCAA), which is comprised of their respective member educational
institutions. A state or national governing body often has monolithic power,
and each high school and university also frequently has its own athlete
eligibility rules and requirements. In contrast to athletes who participate in
Olympic sports, high school and college athletes do not have direct
representation on these governing bodies or a vote regarding athlete
eligibility rules.200 Unlike professional sport athletes, no union represents
the interests of high school or college athletes 201 or collectively bargains for
eligibility rules or an eligibility dispute resolution process (e.g., arbitration)
on their behalf. Similar to the well-known "Golden Rule" in business and
politics, high school and college sports governing bodies have the "gold,"
which provides broad and exclusive authority to adopt, interpret, and
enforce athlete eligibility "rules" subject only to applicable legal constraints.
After exhausting all available internal avenues of relief,20 2 a student-
athlete's only option is to pursue litigation if he or she is dissatisfied with a
rule or decision of a high school or college governing body (or educational
William Thomas, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means (Nov. 13, 2006). See also Gary
Walters, Give Athletics Credit, Literally, The NCAA News, Aug. 13, 2007, at 4, 11 (Princeton
University director of athletics argues that participation in intercollegiate athletics "contributes
to the holistic education of the total person in the same manner as the arts" and that its academic
legitimacy should be recognized rather than disregarded).
200 As one court observed, "As a student, Carlberg has not voluntarily subjected himself to the
rules of the [state high school athletic association]; he has no voice in its rules or leadership. We
note as well the relatively short span of time a student spends in high school compared to the
amount of time often required for institutional policies to change. These factors all point to the
propriety of judicial scrutiny of [state high school athletic association] decisions with respect to
student challenges." Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind.
1997). The same is essentially true for college athletes. Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d
553, 558 (Ala. 1979) ("The individual athlete has no voice or participation in the formulation or
interpretation of these rules and regulations governing his scholarship, even though these
materially control his conduct on and off the field. Thus in some circumstances the college
athlete may be placed in an unequal bargaining position.") (emphasis added).
201 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The
College Athlete as Employee, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 71 (2006) (arguing that NCAA athletes are
employees who should have right to unionize and collectively bargain).
202 See, e.g., Florida High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Melbourne Cent. Catholic High Sch., 867 So.2d
1281, 1287 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004).
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institution) that adversely affects his or her eligibility to participate in an
interscholastic or intercollegiate sport. Unlike Olympic sports that are
governed by the Stevens Act, no federal law provides a framework for
directly regulating high school or college sports or establishes an
independent governing body charged with a legal duty to protect student-
athletes' sports participation opportunities. There is no federal (or state)
constitutional law right to participate in either interscholastic or
intercollegiate athletics, 20 3 and courts rarely find that athlete eligibility rules
or their application in individual cases violate the U.S. Constitution or any
state constitution.2 04 Courts also have uniformly rejected antitrust
challenges to NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules, thereby creating a body
of federal antitrust law jurisprudence holding that these rules are
essentially per se legal.2
05
Although high school and college sports are offered because of their
inherent educational benefits to participants, U.S. courts almost uniformly
refuse to recognize a legally protected interest in interscholastic or
intercollegiate athletic participation (which is the means to the end of
achieving these benefits) absent a valid contractual right to play a sport.
Unless a governing body or educational institution violates federal or state
civil rights laws by promulgating or applying eligibility rules that deny a
high school or college student-athlete an opportunity to participate in sports
based on race, color, national origin, gender, or learning or physical
disability20 6 courts refuse to apply de novo review or anything more than
203 See, e.g., In re United States ex rel. Missouri High Sch. Ath. Ass'n, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982);
Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152 (Sth Cir. 1980); Hysaw v. Washburn
Univ., 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987); Yeo v. NCAA, 171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005); Hart v. NCAA,
550 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 2001).
204 See generally Scott C. Idleman, Religious Freedom and the Interscholastic Athlete, 12 Marq.
Sports L. Rev. 295 (2001). Courts will intervene, however, to protect student-athletes'
substantive rights premised on federal or state constitutional law and statutes. See, e.g., Pryor v.
NCAA, 288 F.3d 548 (3rd Cir. 2002) (holding that student-athletes' complaint alleged intentional
racial discrimination in violation of federal statutes); Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994)
(although ultimately rejecting student-athletes' claim against the NCAA, the court acknowledged
the existence of a state constitutional right of privacy).
205 See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d. Cir. 1998) (finding NCAA eligibility rules
are not related to the NCAA's commercial or business activities and therefore are not subject to
Sherman Act scrutiny); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) (NCAA student-athlete
amateur eligibility rules have no anticompetitive effects); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338
(Sth Cir. 1988) (eligibility rules have predominately precompetitive effects and do not violate
antitrust laws).
206 See, e.g., Garvey v. Unified Sch. Dist. 262, 2005 WL 2548332 (D. Kan.) (Title Vl provides
college athletes with private cause of action for claims of intentional discrimination); Mercer v.
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very limited rational basis review. 20 7
C. Intercollegiate Sports Eligibility Disputes
The NCAA's student-athlete eligibility rules, which have national
application and effect, are, inter alia, designed to maintain academic
integrity, the "amateur" nature of intercollegiate athletics, and/or
competitive balance among its member schools and participants. Most
eligibility disputes arise when a prospective student-athlete fails to satisfy
the NCAA's threshold academic or amateurism requirements, a current
student-athlete violates one of these requirements, or either a prospective
or current student-athlete is denied a requested waiver of a rule or restored
eligibility that would enable him or her to participate in intercollegiate
athletics. 208 Because it has no direct or express contractual relationship with
student-athletes, 20 9 the NCAA has no authority to enforce directly its
eligibility rules, interpretations, and decisions against them. The NCAA does,
however, have the ability to do so indirectly-each of its member
institutions has agreed to conduct its athletics program in full compliance
with its rules and regulations. 210 The NCAA eligibility rules are incorporated
by reference into its member institutions' respective contracts with each of
their student-athletes.211 Institutions must comply with and enforce the
NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and determinations. 212 An institution
that permits a student-athlete to participate after the NCAA has declared
Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding the same under Title IX for gender
discrimination); Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp.2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (finding the same with
respect to discrimination based on a participant's disability).
207 Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, at 230-31 (Ind. 1997).
208 A student-athlete's eligibility to participate in intercollegiate sports also may be adversely
affected by his or her non-compliance with athletic conference or university academic and
conduct rules. Conard v. Univ. of Washington, 834 P.2d 17 (Wash. 1992) (refusing to renew
student-athletes' football scholarships, with corresponding ineligibility to participate in sport,
for engaging in multiple incidents of misconduct). See also Marsh v. Delaware State Univ., 2006
WL 141680 (D. Del, Jan. 19, 2006) (student-athlete expelled following arrest for possession of
drug and weapons possession).
209 Hart v. NCAA, 550 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 2001).
210 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual, arts. 2.1.1, 6.01.1 (2006).
211 The statement of financial aid between student-athletes and their institutions require
athletes to conduct themselves in accordance with the rules and regulations of not only the
institution, but also the NCAA and the athletic association of which the school is a member. See
e.g., Wake Forest University, Wake Forest University Financial Aid Agreement (2007-08) (on file
with the authors).
212 See, e.g., Brennan v. Bd. of Trs., 691 So.2d 324 (La. App. 1997) (university suspends student-
athlete from competition for one year for failing NCAA drug test).
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him or her ineligible risks potentially severe sanctions.
1. Judicial Deference and Academic Abstention
The numerous judicial opinions that reject student-athletes' claims
alleging. the denial of an opportunity to participate in intercollegiate sports
possess, with relatively few exceptions, the common theme of courts'
general deference to NCAA and institutional decision-making. Indeed, these
cases reflect a broader concept-the extraordinary freedom academic
institutions have from any probing judicial scrutiny.213 In reviewing
decisions by universities into purely academic matters, historically courts
have exercised restraint.214 Academic abstention is commonly used to
describe the reticence of courts to impose common law liability "where
doing so would interfere with the college administration's good faith
performance of its core functions." 215
The reasons offered in support of academic abstention include the
perception that institutions possess greater competence than courts to
review academic decisions. 21 6 A related rationale is the questionable
competency of the judiciary to review matters in the absence of
authoritative standards available to courts to apply to particular facts. 21 7
Academic abstention is also derived from the belief that the academic
setting differs from the rest of society and on practical considerations. 21 8
Finally, the doctrine rests on concern regarding the potential financial
213 James Leonard, judicial Deference to Academic Standards Under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Titles 11 and Ill of the American with Disabilities Act, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 27,
48 (1996); Regents v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (indicating that courts should act with
great restraint in reviewing academic decisions).
214 See Leonard, supra note 213, at 48.
215 J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern for the First Amendment," 99 Yale L.J.
251, 323 (1989).
216 Leonard, supra note 213, at 59, 90 (stating that "[jiudicial deference to academic decisions is
a concession to the fact that courts are normally incapable of making meaningful assessments of
academic decisions"). See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (1985).
217 Leonard, supra note 213, at 73 (The "very nature of academic standards makes them
unsuitable for judicial review. These standards are often compromises that reflect the
interaction of many constituencies within the university community. Sometimes these
compromises are delicately balanced to accommodate competing institutional interests."). Id. at
74.
218 Byrne, supra note 215, at 325. Academia is perceived as a world that emphasizes values that
foster "collegial, pedagogical, or disciplinary models of personal relationships that eschew
competition." Id. Whether or not this conceptualization of college comports with reality, it has
profoundly impacted judges and academics such that judicial restraint in academic affairs is
viewed as important to promoting the consensus-building image of academia. Id.
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burden that might be imposed on schools forced to absorb litigation costs
associated with athlete eligibility disputes. 219
In affording the NCAA and its member institutions considerable
deference in disputes with student-athletes, courts have readily endorsed
the academic abstention rationale. 220 In addition to traditional justifications,
such as the expertise of academic decision-makers to make judgments
concerning academic policy, and the historical deference granted private
associations, 221 a unique rationale has surfaced in the athletics arena. Courts
defer to the NCAA and its member schools because of their presumed
expertise in promulgating amateur athletics policy. 222 Consequently, when
examining challenges to NCAA regulations, courts tend to accept the NCAA's
characterization of its rules and regulations, as well as its enunciations of
the underlying motivations for its regulations. 223 This is particularly true
when the contested student-athlete eligibility rule relates to the NCAA's
academic and/or amateurism principles. The judiciary also has exhibited a
willingness to presume that the NCAA acts in accordance with "its own
stated goals and mission."224
Courts generally recognize only narrow exceptions to the rule of non-
interference into the affairs of private voluntary associations. Intervention
is warranted when an association's actions infringe on a personal liberty or
property right and are illegal or fraudulent.2 5 Courts have recognized
similar exceptions to the academic abstention doctrine. A court will "abstain
219 Patrick R. Lineham, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools
Misrepresentations, 89 Geo. L.I. 753, 764-65 (2001).
220 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992) (relying on academic abstention to
justify rejection of an educational malpractice claim).
221 W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 Va. J. Sports & L. 1, 69-
70 (2000); Hispanic College Fund, Inc. v. NCAA, 826 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("Absent
fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere, Indiana
courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of voluntary membership associations."); Cole v.
NCAA, 120 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1071-72 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (NCAA decisions regarding student-athletes
are entitled to considerable judicial deference).
222 Carter, supra note 221, at 70.
223 Id.
224 Id. This approach differs markedly from that taken in cases involving alleged antitrust
violations. There, courts make an initial assessment of whether the challenged rule is motivated
by academic or commercial consideration, and then exempt the former from close scrutiny. In
cases not involving antitrust violations, courts refuse to make an initial determination of
whether the exercise of discretion supports policies worthy of deference.
225 Hispanic College Fund, Inc., 826 N.E.2d at 655 (2005); NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So.2d 1081
(Fla. App. 1996). See also Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ind.
1997).
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from interfering with decisions of school officials and school boards unless
the decision represents an abuse of discretion, is irrational, or violates
constitutional or statutory rights"2 2 6 or is arbitrary.2 27
Although its source is not always clearly articulated,22 8 the arbitrary
and capricious exception theoretically limits the discretion exercised by the
NCAA and colleges in terminating a student-athlete's eligibility. 229 Yet in
only the most egregious cases will the arbitrary and capricious exception be
used to overturn eligibility decisions adverse to student-athletes. 230 In fact,
it is difficult to identify a reported decision in which, absent a violation of its
own rules, a court has ruled that the NCAA's conduct was arbitrary or
capricious.2 3 1 This brings into doubt the value of the standard's effectiveness
as an external means of accountability in which an ineligible student-athlete
seeks an independent review of a governing association's denial of eligibility
through its own unilaterally established internal procedures.
Two recent cases, Bloom v. NCAA and NCAA v. Lasege, illustrate that the
arbitrary and capricious standard does not provide an effective measure of
legal protection to student-athletes in eligibility disputes or appropriately
limit the extreme deference courts afford the NCAA. Through its rulemaking
and enforcement processes, the NCAA articulates values long considered
fundamental to intercollegiate athletics. Despite widespread criticism,2 32 the
amateurism principle remains a value at the core of the NCAA's regulatory
scheme and is an ingrained feature of its student-athlete eligibility rules. For
example, the NCAA's amateurism rules prohibit student-athletes from
226 David L. Dagley & Carole A. Veir, Subverting the Academic Abstention Doctrine in Teacher
Evaluation: How School Reform Legislation Defeats Itself, 1 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.I. 123, 124 (2002).
227 Leonard, supra note 213, at 58.
228 See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004).
229 See, e.g., NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001); Hispanic College Fund, Inc., 826 N.E.2d at
655-56 (2005); See also Reyes, 694 N.E.2d at 256-57 (1997).
230 In the constitutional sense only the most egregious conduct by a governmental official will be
deemed arbitrary and capricious. Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1220 (D. Kan. 2005).
231 For example in California State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90-91 (Cal. App.
1975), the NCAA was enjoined for failing to adhere to its own constitution and bylaws in denying
student-athletes the opportunity to participate in an NCAA championship competition. See also
Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1979).
232 See Walter Byers, Unsportsmanlike Conduct - Exploiting College Athletes, 374-84 (Univ. of
Michigan Press 1995); Gary RL Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 Tul. L.
Rev. 2631 (1996); C. Peter Goplerud Ill, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever,
38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1081 (1997); Matthew J. Mitten, University Price Competition for Elite Students
and Athletes: Illusions and Realities, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 59, 77-78 (1995); Lee Goldman, Sports and
Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 206, 207-08 (1990);
lames V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 Ind. L.. 9, 12 (1986).
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accepting compensation for use of their athletic skills, 233 entering into
contracts with agents, 234 signing contracts to play for professional teams, 2 35
and accepting compensation for endorsing commercial products or
services.
23 6
Bloom v. NCAA 237 arose out of the NCAA's decision to declare Jeremy
Bloom, a gifted snow skier, ineligible to play football for the University of
Colorado. He deferred his education and college football career for a year in
order to compete in the 2002 Winter Olympics. NCAA rules permit an
athlete to play and accept compensation as a professional in one sport (e.g.,
skiing), while retaining amateur eligibility to play another sport (e.g.,
football). As was customary for professional skiers, Bloom contracted to
endorse commercial products to pay for his living expenses and Olympics
training costs; in doing so, he violated NCAA amateurism rules prohibiting a
student-athlete from accepting payment for product or service
endorsements. After the NCAA denied the university's request on his behalf
for a rule waiver, the trial court denied Bloom's request for a declaratory
judgment based on his assertion that "his endorsement, modeling, and
media activities were necessary to support his professional skiing career,
something which the NCAA rules permitted.12
38
Noting that courts are reluctant to intervene in the affairs of a voluntary
private association, the Colorado court of appeals initially held that Bloom
had no legally protected civil or property right to participate in
intercollegiate athletics.239 Nevertheless, the court found that Bloom was a
third party beneficiary of the membership contract governing the
relationship between the NCAA and the University of Colorado.24
0
Consequently, Bloom had standing to pursue his claim that the NCAA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting and applying its eligibility rules
by breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied into every
contract.
241
233 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 210, art. 12.1.2(a).
234 Id. art. 12.1.2(g).
235 Id. art. 12.1.2 (c).
236 Id. art. 12.5.2.1(a) & (b).
237 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004).
238 Id. at 622.
239 Id. at 624.
240 The court found that the "NCAA's constitution, bylaws, and regulations evidence a clear intent
to benefit student-athletes." Id. at 623-24. Consequently, Bloom had standing to contest the
NCAA's application of one of its rules against him.
241 Id. It is unclear whether the duty of good faith provides an independent basis for an increased
level of judicial scrutiny and enhanced protection of athletes' participation opportunity. What is
122
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Regarding the merits of Bloom's claim, the appellate court ruled that the
NCAA's application of its endorsement and media rules to Bloom was
rationally related to a legitimate purpose-maintaining a line of
demarcation between college and professional sports.242 The court
characterized the NCAA as having a special role as the guardian of
amateurism in intercollegiate athletics and accepted, without question, the
NCAA's interpretation of this principle and its underlying policies. 243 Citing
with approval other cases in which courts refused to substitute their
judgment for that of the NCAA, the court concluded that the NCAA's
application of its bylaws was not "manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair."24
4
The Bloom court deferred to the NCAA's broad interpretation of the
subject amateurism rules, its interpretation of the amateurism principle,
and the results of its internal appeals process. Despite finding that he had
standing to assert his claims, the court held that Bloom possessed no legally
protected interest in participating in intercollegiate athletics, and it
judicially validated an eligibility rule without any consideration of whether
its exclusionary effect on this otherwise eligible student-athlete was no
broader than necessary to protect the NCAA's legitimate interests. The court
also refused to characterize the NCAA's duty of good faith and fair dealing as
requiring anything more than very minimal rational basis review, despite
the fact it was reviewing take-it-or-leave it eligibility rules unilaterally
imposed on student-athletes by a monolithic sports governing body.
In NCAA v. Lasege,24s a student-athlete from Nigeria was declared
ineligible by the University of Louisville after he entered into a professional
basketball contract with a Russian team,2 46 signed a representation contract
clear, however, it that the duty of good faith may supply, as it did in Bloom, the basis for
overcoming the standing limitation. As noted by the court in Bloom, courts are required to, but
do not always clearly identify the justification which allows them to substantively evaluate an
arbitrary and capricious claim. Id. at 624.
242 Id. at 626-27. The court also rejected Bloom's claims that the NCAA acted arbitrarily in
allowing colleges to endorse athletic equipment but not student-athletes. "[T]his application of
the bylaw has a rational basis in economic necessity: financial benefits inure not to any single
student-athlete but to member schools and thus to all student-athletes, including those who
participate in programs that generate no revenue." Id. at 627.
243 Id. at 626 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)).
244 Id. at 628.
245 53 S.W.3d 77,82 (Ky. 2001).
246 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 210, art. 12.2.5 (providing that a student-athlete
who enters into a contract to play professional sports loses his or her intercollegiate eligibility in
that sport).
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with a sports agent,247 and received financial benefits stemming from his
status as a student-athlete. 248 The university requested that the NCAA
reinstate Lasege's intercollegiate eligibility based on his ignorance of the
NCAA regulations he had violated. The NCAA's Student-Athlete
Reinstatement Committee declined because it found that his conduct
evidenced a "clear intent to professionalize. 249
The trial court ordered the NCAA to restore Lasege's intercollegiate
eligibility. It concluded that a clear weight of evidence suggested Lasege
violated NCAA amateurism rules not in an effort to become a professional
athlete but only to obtain a visa which would allow him to become a
student-athlete in the United States.250 On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme
Court adopted the general principle that courts should avoid interference in
the affairs of voluntary associations.251 Like Bloom, it recognized that
judicial intervention is warranted only when a "voluntary association acts
arbitrarily and capriciously toward student-athletes."2 52 The court found
that the NCAA's refusal to restore Lasege's eligibility did not violate this
standard. Deferring to the NCAA, the court determined that its eligibility
determination was entitled to a presumption of correctness particularly
because Lasege admitted the violations.
2S3
2. Deprivation of Eligibility to Participate in Intercollegiate Athletics Does
Not Require Due Process of Law
Because the NCAA is a private association, 25 4 student-athletes rendered
ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics can assert federal denial
of due process claims against only public colleges and universities, which
247 A student-athlete who signs a contract to be represented by a sports agent will lose his or her
intercollegiate eligibility. Id. at art 12.3.1.
248 A student-athlete who uses his athletic skill to receive compensation in a sport loses his
intercollegiate eligibility in that sport. Id. at art. 12.1.2(a).
249 Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at81 (2001).
250 Id. at 82.
251 Id. at 83.
252 Id. at 83. According to the court, a ruling is arbitrary and capricious only "where it is 'clearly
erroneous,' and by 'clearly erroneous' we mean 'unsupported by substantial evidence."' Id. at 85
(citing Thurman v. Meridian Mutual Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Ky. 1961)).
253 Id. at 85. In comparison to Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 557-58 (Ala. 1979), in
which a student-athlete successfully challenged his denial of eligibility because a college
athletics conference had misinterpreted its own rules, Bloom and Lasege involved student-
athlete substantive challenges to the legality of properly applied NCAA rules.
254 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195-96 (1988).
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are "state actors" subject to the constraints of the federal constitution. 255
The Due Process Clause protects only property and liberty interests. 25 6 A
property interest arises when a plaintiff can establish a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" to the benefit that he or she seeks to protect; "a person must
clearly have more than an abstract need or desire for it."25 7 A liberty interest
extends beyond imprisonment to include "a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity."258 According to the Supreme Court, property interests
"are 'not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined' by an independent source such as state statutes or
rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits."5 9
Courts generally refuse to recognize a constitutionally protected
property interest in intercollegiate athletic competition and reject
arguments that such participation is necessary to develop the skills
necessary for a future professional sports career.260 Although many college
athletes aspire to a professional career, few achieve their dreams and such
aspirations are considered speculative and not subject to constitutional
protection. 261 Courts do recognize a student-athlete's property interest in
the economic value of his or her athletic scholarship, which constitutes a
one-year contract with his or her university.262 However, an athletic
scholarship itself does not create a constitutionally protected property right
to participate in intercollegiate sports. 263
255 Id. at 192.
256 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
257 Id. at 578.
258 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971)).
259 Id. at 572-73 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972)). Once a property or
liberty interest is established, a state actor cannot deprive a person of their interest without due
process which requires the opportunity for a hearing. The nature of the hearing requires, at a
minimum, an impartial decision maker, notice, and the opportunity to be heard. Diane Heckman,
Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing Interscholastic Athletics, 5 Va.
Sports & Ent. L.I. 1, 19 (2005).
260 See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Il1. 1997); Lesser v. Neosho County Cmty. Coll., 741 F.
Supp. 854 (D. Kan. 1990); Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1984); Rutledge v. Arizona Rd. of
Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981); Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981).
261 Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir.
1978).
262 Conard v. Univ. of Washington, 834 P.2d 17, 22-23 (Wash. 1992).
263 Hysaw v. Washburn Univ., 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987). If an institution has fulfilled its
obligation during the one-year contract term by allowing a student-athlete's access to
scholarship funds, courts conclude that a he or she has not been deprived of a property interest.
Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991). Moreover, courts have refused
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NCAA v. Yea 264 represents the prevailing judicial approach that rejects
student-athlete due process challenges to NCAA eligibility rules or adverse
interpretations of such rules.2 65 After transferring from the University of
California at Berkeley ("Cal-Berkeley") to the University of Texas-Austin
("UT") before the 2000-01 academic year, Joscelin Yeo attempted to satisfy
an NCAA transfer rule that required a one-year period of ineligibility by not
participating in intercollegiate swimming during the fall 2000 or spring
2001 semesters at UT.2 66 She did not enroll in classes during the fall 2000
semester in order to participate in the Olympics (as permitted by NCAA
rules), but she was enrolled as a student during the spring 2001 semester.267
During the fall 2001 semester she competed in four swimming events based
on UT's erroneous advice that NCAA rules allowed her to do so. 265 After
complaints from Cal-Berkeley (which initially refused to waive the transfer
rule), UT admitted its error and disqualified Yeo from participating in
to imply into the student-athlete/university contract terms that would create an entitlement to
athletic participation that extend beyond contract's one-year term. See, e.g., Gonyo v. Drake
Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 994 (S.D. Iowa 1993); (not reaching the above conclusion because the
school continued the scholarships) Lesser v. Neosho County Cmty Coil., 741 F.Supp. 854, 861-62
(D. Kan. 1990); Conard, 834 P.2d at 22-23. But see Richard v. Perkins, 373 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1219
(D. Kan 2005) (holding that although there is no property interest in athletic participation, a
university cannot act arbitrarily and capriciously and escape judicial scrutiny). According to one
commentator, advocates "argue that what is bargained for between the student-athlete and the
institution is not merely the express provisions of the scholarship agreement, but instead a much
broader package of benefits." John P. Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: What's
Left After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian?, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 621, 657 (1989).
See also Brian L. Porto, Note, Balancing Due Process and Academic Integrity in Intercollegiate
Athletics: The Scholarship Athlete's Limited Property Interest in Eligibility, 62 Ind. L.]. 1151
(1987). In rejecting such arguments, courts reason in part that to imply terms into the
agreement would lead to improper judicial intrusion into academic affairs. See Ross v. Creighton
Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1992).
264 171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005).
265 See Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the NCAA:
Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 545, 565
(discussing the unwillingness of courts to entertain student-athlete due process claims);
Katherine Elizabeth Maskevich, Comment, Getting Due Process into the Game: A Look at the
NCAA's Failure to Provide Member Institutions with Due Process and the Effect on Student-
Athletes, 15 Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent L. 299, 318 (2005).
266 Under NCAA rules, a student-athlete who transfers from one four-year institution to another
typically cannot compete in intercollegiate competition for his or her new school for one full
year unless the college from which he or she transfers waives this restriction. Yea, 171 S.W.3d at
866 (2005). 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 210, art. 14.5.5.1.
267 Yea, 171 S.W.3d at 866 (2005).
268 Id.
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additional swimming competitions during the fall 2001 semester and part of
the spring 2002 semester, including the NCAA women's swimming
championship, to fulfill the one-year transfer restriction.
Seeking to participate in the NCAA championship, Yeo alleged that UT
denied her procedural due process under the Texas Constitution and
requested a court order enjoining UT from disqualifying her.2 69
Acknowledging precedent that students do not possess protectable
property interests in extracurricular activities,2 70 Yeo argued that her pre-
existing reputation as a world-class athlete in her home country and her
potential earning potential represented an interest that was separate and
apart from her intercollegiate swimming career."271 Rejecting Yeo's
argument, the Texas Supreme Court held that a mere good reputation does
not give rise to due process protection and that Yeo's future athletic
potential was too speculative to be protected.272 In characterizing Yeo's
future athletic potential as speculative, the Texas Supreme Court, like
previous courts, held that a student-athlete's participation in college sports
does not constitute a property interest for constitutional purposes. 273
Yeo is another example of the prevailing trend of judicial deference to
intercollegiate sports governing bodies and educational institutions and
corresponding abstention regarding athletic eligibility disputes. Yeo
strongly suggests that participation in intercollegiate athletics is not
sufficiently important to warrant judicial scrutiny or intervention, even
when a student-athlete has reasonably relied and acted on advice that
adversely affects her athletic eligibility and economic interests.27 4 Yeo also
reflects the judiciary's perceived lack of competence to resolve the merits of
disputes arising in an academic setting,2 75 which is based on the
269 Id.
170 Id. at 868.
271 Id. at 869. The court of appeals found these facts warranted its finding that Yeo possessed a
liberty interest in her reputation (which entitled her to due process protection), and
distinguished her case from others where courts had refused to recognize a liberty or property
interest NCAA v. Yeo, 114 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tex. App. 2003).
272 Yeo, 171 S.W.3d at 870 (2005).
273 See e.g., Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd 570 F.2d 320
(10th Cir. 1978).
274 See Alfred D. Mathewson, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Assignment of Legal Rights, 35 St.
Louis U. L.I. 39, 47-48 (tracing the history of judicial marginalization of sports-related matters).
275 The court noted, "We have twice reminded the lower courts that 'judicial intervention in
[student athletic disputes] often does more harm than good." Yeo, 171 S.W.3d at 870 (2005). See
generally Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 265, at 565-66 (commenting that courts find that
student-athletes do not possess a property interest in intercollegiate athletics not only on the
HeinOnline  -- 8 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 127 2008-2009
VOL.8:1 VIRGINIA SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL FALL 2008
presumption that the NCAA and its member institutions are in the best
position to resolve athletic eligibility disputes and should be allowed to do
so with only minimal judicial scrutiny.276 Although not expressly addressed
in Yeo, practical considerations also prompt judicial reluctance to grant
student-athletes a property or liberty interest in intercollegiate athletic
participation. Preeminent among them is concern that recognition of such
an interest will impose an undue burden on the judicial process given the
substantial number of claims student-athletes might potentially assert.
2 77
3. Analysis and Conclusions
The significant degree of deference exercised by courts when
confronted with intercollegiate student-athlete eligibility disputes is derived
from the convergence of the academic abstention doctrine, the law of
private associations, an unwillingness to "constitutionalize" these issues,
and pragmatic considerations. Deference premised on the law of private
associations is particularly troublesome. As noted above, the deference
granted by courts in the athletics context is derived, in part, from the law of
private associations. 2 7
8
In the context of an athletic eligibility dispute, a blind adherence to
private association law seems unwarranted when a non-association
member such as a student-athlete challenges an adverse eligibility decision
rendered by a monolithic sports governing body. Not only are student-
athletes not members of athletic associations or governing bodies, but they
do not possess the ability or opportunity to ever become members.
279
Therefore, there is no direct contractual relationship that provides student-
athletes with a voice and a vote concerning the governing body's eligibility
rules, which is the underlying basis for judicial deference in other
contexts. 280 The application of deference premised on private association
basis of constitutional doctrine but also due to concerns related to their competency in deciding
matters in an academic setting and practical considerations).
276 See Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 265 at 565.
277 Id. at 562.
278 The well-established rule is that, except in limited circumstances, courts will not interfere in
the internal affairs of private associations. See e.g., Wilson Realty & Constr., Inc. v. Asheboro-
Randolph Bd. of Realtors, 518 S.E.2d 28, 30 (N.C. App. 1999); Levant v. Whitley, 755 A.2d 1036,
1043 (D.C. App. 2000).
279 Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 558 (Ala. 1979) (observing that most rules and
regulations "are promulgated by athletic associations whose membership is composed of the
individual colleges [and that the] individual athlete has no voice or participation in the
formulation or interpretation of these rules and regulations").
288 Ermert v. Hartford Ins. Co., 559 So.2d 467, 473 (La. 1990) (noting that private associations
128
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law is also questionable given the substantial interests at stake in athletic
eligibility disputes. 281 As a result of such extreme deference, courts do not
recognize a legally protected interest in the opportunity to participate in
intercollegiate athletics and generally refrain from considering the merits of
athletic eligibility disputes. The underlying reasons for refusing to do so
appear to be concern about substituting their judgment for that of the NCAA
and institutions of higher education as well as considerations of judicial
economy.
Yeo, Bloom, and Lasege, all of which involve athletic eligibility rules
unrelated to academic requirements for student-athletes, illustrate that the
seemingly automatic application of judicial deference is unjustified. 282 The
legitimate concerns that are captured in the academic abstention doctrine
are absent when non-academic eligibility matters are at issue. As
demonstrated by these cases, the extent to which NCAA and institutional
athletic eligibility determinations may adversely impact student-athletes'
overall educational experiences as well as their present and future
economic interests suggests that courts should not always blindly defer to
the NCAA. Rather, more probing judicial scrutiny may be appropriate in
some cases.28 3 This is particularly true because, notwithstanding NCAA
Student-Athlete Advisory Committees,28 4 student-athletes' interests are not
directly represented in the process for promulgating, interpreting, or
enforcing NCAA eligibility rules. Moreover, some commentators have
are the product of a contract).
281 John C. Weistart & Cym H. Lowell, The Law of Sports 42-43 (1979) (questioning the
application of private association law in the athletic context since athletes are not athletic
members of athletics associations and due to the substantial interests of athletes at stake in
eligibility cases). See Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. 1299, 1318 n.35 (1992) (arguing the rule of non-interference is unwarranted where
litigants, such as athletes, are not members of the association); GulfS. Conf., 369 So.2d 553 at 557
(Ala. 1979) (refusing to apply non-interference doctrine in dispute between athlete and athletic
associations).
282 Gordon E. Gouveia, Making a Mountain Out ofa Mogul, Jeremy Bloom v. NCAA and Unjustified
Denial of Compensation Under NCAA Amateurism Rules, 6 Vand. J. Ent L. & Prac. 22, 26 (2003)
(arguing deference in matters and disputes where athletes challenged NCAA amateurism
regulations is unjustified).
283 See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
284 At its 1989 convention, the NCAA created an association-wide Student Athlete Advisory
Committee (SAAC). Each NCAA division has a SAAC comprised of student athletes from NCAA
member institutions. The SAAC's role is "to provide insight on the student-athlete experience
and offer input regarding the rules, regulations and policies affecting student-athletes' lives" on
NCAA member institution campuses. NCAA Student Athlete Advisory Committee 2-3 (Sept
2004).
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suggested that no effective internal mechanism currently exists within the
NCAA's governance structure to fully protect student-athletes' interests.
2 15
The existing legal framework provides very limited protection to
student-athletes in athletic eligibility disputes and contrasts sharply with
the corresponding legal regimes governing eligibility disputes involving
Olympic and professional athletes. Student-athletes lack the necessary
leverage and direct representation to have an effective voice in athletic
eligibility rulemaking and NCAA regulation. In contrast, major league
professional team sport athletes exercise substantial bargaining power
through their respective unions. 286 Olympic athletes also have direct
representatives with a voice and voting power on governing bodies that
promulgate athlete eligibility rules for particular sports.28 7
In the case of intercollegiate athletics, the arbitrary and capricious
standard, as applied by the Bloom and Lasege courts, reflects judicial
reluctance to micromanage the manner in which private associations or
educational institutions apply their policies.288 The end result is that courts
defer to the decisions of the NCAA and institutions with regard to matters
that are not necessarily related to maintaining higher education's academic
freedom and integrity. By exercising such extreme deference, courts decline
to carefully scrutinize and balance appropriately the conflicting interests of
the NCAA, its member institutions, and student-athletes that frequently
arise in eligibility disputes.
By comparison, when resolving eligibility disputes involving Olympic
athletes, the Court of Arbitration for Sport conducts a de novo hearing and
appears to better protect an athlete's opportunity to participate in sports
without always providing extreme deference to international sports
governing bodies. 289 These realities suggest that courts should not apply
rigid deferential scrutiny to all student-athlete eligibility disputes. As
28s See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a Non-Profit
Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 851 (2002) (arguing an independent
means of protecting the interests of student-athletes may be warranted given that "institutional
interests are powerfully represented, but there is currently minimal representation of student-
athlete interests"); Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 265, at 546-47. For example, NCAA
member institutions can attempt to change legislation on which an adverse eligibility decision
was based or they can leave the association. These options are unavailable to student-athletes,
who are precluded from membership in the NCAA and lack an effective mechanism for changing
NCAA rules and regulations from within the organization. See Mathewson, supra note 274, at 50.
286 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
287 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
288 See Marsh v. Del. State Univ., No. Civ.A. 05-00087JF, 2006 WL 141680, at *5 (D. Del. 2006).
289 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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discussed more fully infra,290 a heightened standard of judicial review is
appropriate in at least some cases.
D. Interscholastic Sports Eligibility Disputes
Similar to the prevailing judicial approach for intercollegiate sports,
courts have granted substantial deference to sports governing bodies and
educational institutions when considering student-athletes' challenges to
rules and regulations precluding or limiting their participation in
interscholastic (high school) sports. These rules and regulations are
promulgated at the statewide level by state interscholastic athletic
associations and at the local level by individual schools and school districts.
State athletic associations, which typically are composed of public and
private member high schools, promulgate and enforce student-athlete
eligibility rules to achieve legitimate objectives of broad concern to their
members such as academic integrity, competitive balance, and health and
safety. Unlike with college sports, direct recruiting of students by member
high schools for athletics-related reasons is prohibited. As a means of
achieving this objective, transfer rules often restrict the eligibility of
student-athletes to participate immediately in interscholastic athletics after
transferring from one school to another or from one school district to
another.291 Eligibility rules created and enforced at local levels by individual
schools or school districts often address more discrete matters, such as
those conditioning a student-athlete's eligibility to participate in sports on
complying with conduct 292 or grooming standards.2 93
Student-athletes who have received adverse eligibility determinations
after exhausting internal administrative mechanisms 294 have sought relief
from courts in cases involving rules relating to their inability to participate
in both a school and a non-school or club sport,2 95 as well as ineligibility to
participate because of their status as a home-schooled child,2 96
misconduct,297 transfer from one school to another, 298 exceeding maximum
290 See infra notes 354-62 and accompanying text.
291 Mitten, et aL., supra note 3, at 21.
292 Brands v. Sheldon Cmty. Sch., 671 F.Supp. 627 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
293 See, e.g., Davenport v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 730 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir. 1984).
294 Student-athletes must exhaust administrative remedies before turning to courts for recourse.
See, e.g., Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Melbourne Cent Catholic High Sch., 867 So.2d 1281,
1286-87 (Fla. Ct App. 2004).
295 See infra notes 335-37 and accompanying text
296 See infra notes 325-34 and accompanying text.
297 See infra notes 305-06, 312-15 and accompanying text.
298 See, e.g., Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, San Diego Section, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 805 (Cal.
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age limitations, 99 and failing to meet minimum academic requirements
(e.g., no-pass, no play rules).300 These cases raise important questions
regarding the nature and scope of a student-athlete's legal interest in
interscholastic sports participation as well as the exclusionary effects of
eligibility rules and their application to deny athletic participation
opportunities in specific situations.
1. No Constitutional Property or Liberty Interest in Interscholastic Athletic
Eligibility
As is true at the intercollegiate level, even if the requisite state action
necessary to trigger federal constitutional protection exists,301 the
prevailing view is that participation in interscholastic athletics is not a
federally protected property right or liberty interest.302 However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that high school students have a legally
protected interest in "attending and participating in extracurricular
activities," such as school-sponsored athletic events, "as part of a complete
educational experience."303 Nevertheless, absent violation of some other
independent constitutional right, a high school athletic association or school
rule or decision rendering a student-athlete ineligible to participate in
interscholastic sports does not violate the Constitution.304
Brands v. Sheldon Community School,30 which upholds a public high
App. 4th 2001) (articulating majority rule that there is no property interest in interscholastic
athletics in case involving student-athlete challenging a transfer rule); accord Ind. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 242 (Ind. 1997) (reaching the same result).
299 See, e.g., Baisden v. W. Va. Secondary Schs. Activities Comm'n, 568 S.E.2d 32 (W. Va. 2002);
Tiffany v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 726 P.2d 231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
300 See, e.g, Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 560, 561 (Tex. 1985) (finding, where
students required to maintain a "70" average in all classes to be eligible to participate in
interscholastic activities .that participation in interscholastic sports is neither a fundamental
right for equal protection purposes nor a property or liberty interest for due process purposes).
301 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
302 See, e.g., A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 05-4092, 2005 WL 3560658 (C.D. Ill. 2005) (adopting the
majority rule that student-athletes possess no protectable property interest in interscholastic
athletics and citing to cases that have similarly held); Brown v. Oklahoma Secondary Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 125 P.3d 1219, 1227 (Okla. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff's assertion he possessed a
right to participate in interscholastic athletics); Ryan, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 805 (Cal. App. 4th
2001) (articulating majority rule denying property interest in interscholastic athletics).
303 Santa Fe Indep. School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000).
304 Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding a
"student's interest in participating in a single year of interscholastic athletics amounts to a mere
expectation rather than a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement").
305 671 F.Supp. 627 (N.D. Iowa 1987). See also Ryan, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 805 (2001) (finding no
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school's disciplinary action rendering a student-athlete ineligible for
interscholastic athletic competition for violating its good conduct rules, 306
illustrates the majority view. In Brands, a student-athlete was declared
ineligible to participate on his high school's interscholastic wrestling team
because he and three other male students engaged in multiple acts of sexual
intercourse with a sixteen-year-old female student. School officials
suspended the athlete and declared him ineligible, in part, because his
conduct was "detrimental to the best interests" of the school district.30 7 The
suspension prevented the plaintiff from defending his state wrestling
championship.
In attempting to set aside his suspension, the plaintiff argued, inter alia,
that he had been deprived of substantive and procedural due process
rights. 308 The court framed the procedural due process issue as "whether
the plaintiff has a legitimate claim that he is entitled to participate and not a
'mere expectation' that he will be permitted to do so."309 Noting that most
courts hold that student-athletes have a mere expectancy rather than a
property interest, the Brands court found that the speculative nature of
whether a student-athlete might obtain a college scholarship based on how
he performed in the state wrestling championship justified its refusal to
recognize the existence of a property interest in athletic participation. 310 If a
property interest existed, according to the court, it would have been created
property interest in interscholastic sports and identifying the holding as consistent with "the
holding of virtually every court that has addressed the issue").
306 "'Good conduct rules' refer to school rules that attempt to govern out-of-school conduct, as
well as in-school conduct by students engaged in extracurricular activities." Larry D. Bartlett,
The Courts' View of Good Conduct Rules for High School Student Athletes, 82 Ed. L. Rep. 1087,
1088 (1993). Good conduct rules are directed at prohibiting behaviours, including consuming
alcohol. See, e.g., Smith v. Chippewa Falls Area Unified Sch. Dist., 302 F.Supp.2d 953, 955-56
(student-athlete's ineligibility based on high school athletic code precluding consumption of
alcohol). The rules are also directed at prohibiting the use of illegal drugs and tobacco. See
Dominic J. v. Wyoming Valley W. High Sch., 362 F.Supp.2d 560,563 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Finally, they
are directed at requiring students to abide by community standards of decency as a condition to
participation in extracurricular activities including sports. See Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90,
94 (3rd Cir. 1989) (participation in extracurricular activities hinged on a student demonstrating
"good citizenship and responsibility").
307 Brands v. Sheldon Cmty. Sch., 671 F.Supp. 627,629 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
308 Id. at 630.
309 Id. at 630-31.
310 Id. at 631. See Ryan, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811 (2001) (stating that "[tihe acquisition of a
scholarship is purely speculative, contingent upon far more than simply maintaining playing
privileges," and adding that a scholarship is contingent on many factors including the student's
performance athletically and academically).
133
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by the high school's policies and administrative rules. Because his sanction
was in accordance with the school's administrative rules and policies, the
student-athlete had no legitimate basis for successfully asserting that he
was deprived of a property interest.311
Recent decisions have followed the approach adopted in Brands. In
Taylor v. Enumclaw School District No. 216,31 2 a case of first impression, the
Washington Court of Appeals held that participation in interscholastic
sports does not give rise to a protected property or liberty interest. A
football player suspended from athletic participation for consuming alcohol
argued that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated
because he was denied the ability "to confront his accuser, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and review the evidence against him in the
disciplinary hearing."313 He emphasized the importance of participating in
interscholastic athletics, which he claimed would enable him to attend
college on a football scholarship. 314 He also asserted that recognition of a
property interest in athletic participation was justified because athletics are
an integral part of the high school educational process, which gave rise to a
reasonable expectation that he would not be arbitrarily and capriciously
denied the right to participate. Although the court acknowledged the
importance of sports participation to his overall education, it refused to hold
that each individual component of the educational process constituted a
separate property right.315
Only a few courts have held that student-athletes have a constitutionally
311 Id. at 631. The court found that assuming a property interest existed, plaintiff should
nevertheless be denied relief since he received all the process due to him. This result will
typically follow due to the minimal level of due process required. In Goss v. Lopez, the Court
stated that where a property interests exists, students who are suspended for misconduct for ten
or fewer days are entitled only to "rudimentary" procedures consisting of "an informal give-and-
take between student and disciplinarian." See Smith, 302 F.Supp.2d at 957-58 (holding school
administrators' conduct in suspending student-athlete comported with procedural due process
even though student had no such right since athletic participation does not give rise to a
protected property interest).
312 133 P.3d 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
313 Id. at 495.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 496-97. The court stated that "[ailthough participation in extracurricular activities,
including sports, clearly supplements and enriches a student's educational experience ...
participation in interscholastic sports is a privilege, not a protected property or liberty interest
arising under Washington law." Id. at 497. See Ryan, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810 (indicating that
"[plarticipation in interscholastic athletics, standing alone is but one stick in the bundle of the
educational process and does not rise to the level of a separate property or liberty interest....").
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protected property interest in high school sports participation. Their
underlying rationale is that sports participation is integral to students' high
school education, to a future college athletics scholarship, or to a lucrative
professional sports career.316 Boyd v. Board of Directors of McGehee School
District317  held that a student-athlete's continued participation in
interscholastic athletics was sufficiently important to both his future
educational and economic development that it is a constitutionally
protected property interest 318 However, the extent to which Boyd departs
from the majority view is somewhat uncertain, because the plaintiff's
underlying claim raised issues of racial discrimination, implicating another
independent federal constitutional right.
Similarly, in Duffey v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic
Association, Inc., 319 the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on state
education regulations as the independent source of a student's property
right to participate in interscholastic athletics. The regulations stated that
activities, "including athletics, should be considered a part of the
curriculum," and that "state athletic programs [are] an integral part of the
entire school program." 320 The court also noted the "common sense
recognition" of the educational and economic benefits that may accrue from
316 Most courts have rejected the argument that a future college athletics scholarship creates a
protected property right. As a California court observed: "The acquisition of a scholarship is
purely speculative, contingent upon far more than simply maintaining playing privileges. For
example, a scholarship is contingent upon not only the availability of the scholarship, but also
the student's excelling during season, meeting certain academic and entrance exam
requirements, overcoming any inference from a disciplinary record, remaining healthy, and
overcoming like competitors for the same finite scholarships that are distributed by coaches in
their unbridled discretion." Id. at 811. The presumed speculative nature of a student-athlete
acquiring a scholarship appears to serve as a surrogate for judicial concern that participation in
sports is not important enough to clog the judicial system with cases regarding interscholastic
athletic eligibility. McFarlin v. Newport Special Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 589, 593 (E.D. Ark. 1992)
("[S]hould this court 'create' the property interest that plaintiffs request, it could only result in a
deluge of litigation over not only athletic participation, but also participation in activities that others
may hold dear as some do sports, such as band, theatre, or choir."). Given that approximately seven
million student-athletes engaged in interscholastic sports, the refusal to recognize a property
interest in athletic participation may represent pragmatic considerations related to judicial
economy. The fear is that the judiciary would be overwhelmed by establishing rights that would
encourage litigation.
317 612 F.Supp. 86 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
318 Id. at 93 (relying on testimony that plaintiff's "participation in high school sports is vital and
indispensable to a college scholarship and, in essence, a college education").
319 446 A.2d 462 (N.H. 1982).
320 Id. at 467.
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high school athletic participation. 32 t Notwithstanding Boyd and Duffey, the
vast majority of courts hold that there is no a property right or liberty
interest in high school sports participation. 322 The majority view constitutes
a judicial consensus that, absent infringement of constitutional rights
independent of a high school student's status as an athlete, his or her
eligibility to participate is not subject to protection under the Constitution.
2. Judicial Deference and Academic Abstention
Reflecting the perceived lack of importance that athletic participation
plays in the educational process, courts afford interscholastic athletic
associations and schools considerable deference regarding their internal
resolution of athletic participation disputes.32 3 Even when student-athletes
assert that infringement of independent and traditionally recognized federal
constitutional rights by public high schools or state high school governing
bodies deemed to be state actors adversely affects their athletic
participation interests, generally only rational basis review is applied absent
discrimination or exclusion based on race, color, national origin, or
gender.32 4
A rational basis test has been applied where students are denied any
opportunity to participate in a school's interscholastic athletics program.
For example, courts uniformly have upheld rules prohibiting otherwise
eligible home-schooled students from participating in interscholastic
sports. 325 Although they elect to opt out of formalized high school education
321 Id.
322 Farver v. Board. of Educ. of Carroll County, 40 F.Supp.2d 323, 324 (D. Md. 1999) ("Even
recognizing that these days colleges are farm teams for the pros, and high schools are farm
teams for colleges, and that, for champion athletes, certainly there could be economic
consequences, the right to participate in extracurricular activities, as distinguished from the
right to attend school, is not considered a protected interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
323 In re Univ. Interscholastic League, 20 S.W.3d 690, 692 (Tex. 2000) (holding that there is no
fundamental right to participate in extracurricular activities and reasoning that judicial
intervention into the matters of educational institutions do more harm than good).
324 Hadley v. Rush Henrietta Central School District, No. 05-CV-6331T, 2007 WL 1231753 (W.D.
N.Y. Apr. 25,2007); Garvey v. Unified Sch. Dist. 262,2005 WL 2548332 (D. Kan.).
325 A comprehensive discussion of the merits of allowing home-schooled children to participate
in interscholastic athletic competition is beyond the scope of this paper. Differing views on the
subject may be found in Batista & Hatfield, infra note 326. See also Darryl C. Wilson, Home Field
Advantage: The Negative Impact of Allowing Home-Schoolers to Participate in Mainstream
Sports, 3 Va. J. Sports & L. 1 (2001); Kathryn Gardner & Allison J. McFarland, Legal Precedents
and Strategies Shaping Home Schooled Students' Participation in Public School Sports, 11 J. Legal
Aspects Sport 25 (2001).
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systems, many parents desire that their children receive the educational and
other benefits of participating in interscholastic sports offered by local
public schools. 32 6
]ones v. West Virginia State Board of Education32 7 illustrates the
prevailing judicial response to litigation by home-schooled children seeking
to play interscholastic sports. The West Virginia Secondary School Activities
Commission ("WVSSAC") denied a home-schooled child's request that he be
permitted to join a public middle school's wrestling team. The boy's parents
alleged that their son's exclusion from athletic participation violated his
equal protection rights as a home-schooled child.
The West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that participation in
interscholastic extracurricular activities, including sports, is not a
constitutionally protected right, much less a fundamental right justifying
heightened scrutiny.328  Deferring to the state athletic association's
judgment, the court applied the rational basis test.32 9 It found that
promoting academics over athletics and protecting the economic interests
of the county school systems justified categorically excluding home-
schooled children from athletic participation. 330 With respect to the
326 See Paul ]. Batista & Lance C. Hatfield, Learn at Home, Play at School, 15 J. Legal Aspects Sport
213, 216 (2005).
327 622 S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 2005). Approximately 1.9 million students are currently home-
schooled in the United States. Andrew Lawrence, Out At Home?, Sports Illus., Oct. 30, 2006, at 40.
328 Id. at 295-96. In Pelletier v. Maine Principals' Assoc., 261 F.Supp.2d 10, at 13, the court
rejected claims asserted by parents of home-schooled students, denying the right to participate
in interscholastic athletics at a private school and concluding that there is no fundamental right
to athletic participation. Accord Bradstreet v. Sobel, 630 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (1995) (home-
schooled student failed to establish a property interest in interscholastic athletic participation).
329 Id. at 306. Other courts have adopted a rational basis standard of review. See Angstadt v.
Midd-West School District, 377 F.3d 338 (3rd Cir. 2004); Pelelitier v. Maine Principals' Assoc.,
261 F.Supp.2d 10 (D. Maine, 2003). In Kaptein v. Conrad School Dist., 931 P.2d 1311 (Mont.
1997), the Montana Supreme Court applied a middle-tier standard of review, indicating that "a
student's right to participate in extracurricular activities, although not a fundamental right, is
'clearly subject to constitutional protection.'" Id. at 1316. Application of this standard
nevertheless resulted in a ruling in favor of the defendant, because the school district's interest
in restricting participation to enrolled students outweighed the private-school student's interest
in participating in extracurricular activities. Id. at 1317. But see Davis v. Massachusetts
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 94-2887, 3 Mass. L. Rep. 375 Mass Super. CL Jan. 18, 1995)
(holding that playing sports does not invoke a fundamental right, and that a student-athlete is
not a member of a suspect class, but granting injunctive relief because the distinction between
home-schooled and non-home-schooled children was not rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose).
330 Jones v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 622 S.E.2d at 296 (W. Va. 2005). See also
Bradstreet v. Sobol, 630 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1995) (regulations bore rational
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academic rationale, the court deferred to the judgment of school officials
who expressed concerns regarding the potential negative impact on
maintaining the academic integrity of its interscholastic programs caused by
the differences in curriculum, grading standards, and methods between
home-schooled and publicly educated children.331
Further, in Reid v. Kenowa Hills Public Schools, 332 the court also rejected
a challenge by a home-schooled student to a Michigan High School Athletic
Association rule that only students enrolled in school for at least twenty
hours can participate in extra-curricular sports. Although it agreed with the
parents that the pertinent Michigan statute granted parents the right to
direct the education of their children and required public schools to assist
them, the court held that the statute did not entitle home-schooled students
to participate in interscholastic athletics (which it deemed to be a privilege,
not a constitutional right). Applying the rational basis test, the court
distinguished between academic instruction and participation in
interscholastic sports. It concluded that only the former was required by the
state's educational law. 333
Courts have adopted a similar approach in uniformly rejecting legal
challenges to "outside competition" rules, which generally prohibit student-
athletes from participating on a non-school or club team as a condition of
participating in the same sport on a high school team during the same
season or academic year.334 In Letendre v. Missouri State High School
Activities Association,335 the court upheld the Missouri State High School
Activities Association's ("MSHSAA") outside competition rule and ruled that
it did not violate student-athletes' equal protection rights. Finding no
violation of any fundamental constitutional right and no creation of a
suspect classification, the court applied rational basis review. It concluded
that the outside competition rule is rationally related to the MSHSAA's
relationship to stated purposes of "promoting loyalty and school spirit.., securing role models
for other students ... [and] maintaining academic standards for participation in interschool
sports activities").
331 The same result was reached in Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. District, 377 F.3d 338 (3rd Cir.
2004).
332 680 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. App. 2004).
333 Id. at 67-68. See also Jones v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 197 CalApp.3d 751, 757 (1988)
(applying a rational basis standard since participation in interscholastic sports does not involve
a fundamental right). Accord Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-1, 135 F.3d 694, 698
(10th Cir. 1998).
334 See, e.g., Burrows v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 891 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1989); Zuments v.
Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 737 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Colo. App. 1987).
335 86 S.W.3d 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
138
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legitimate objectives, including preventing conflicts between sports and
academics, discouraging an overemphasis on sports by students, avoiding
conflicts in coaching philosophy and scheduling, and promoting competitive
equity.336
In addition to rational basis review, courts implicitly rely on the
academic abstention doctrine to provide only limited judicial scrutiny of the
merits of student-athlete eligibility disputes pursuant to the law of private
associations. 337 In Indiana High School Athletic Association v. Carlberg,338 the
Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana High School Athletic
Association ("IHSAA") was "analogous to a government agency with respect
to challenges to its rules and enforcement actions brought by students."
Although the court recognized that the students were not represented in the
association's leadership, did not voluntarily subject themselves to the
association's athletic eligibility rules, and had no voice in the making of
those rules, it refused to provide de novo review in disputes challenging the
validity or application of the rules.
The court held that deferential "arbitrary and capricious" review, the
standard generally applied in reviewing administrative agency action, is
appropriate. According to the court, this "is a narrow standard of review and
the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
IHSAA." 3 39 The rule or decision will be found to be arbitrary and capricious
336 Id. at 68. The court's conclusion is troublesome given the obvious self-interest of a high
school sports governing body in maintaining exclusive regulatory authority over high school
student-athletes, including their participation in athletic participation sponsored by other
organizations. The Stevens Act recognizes, as a matter of policy, the impropriety of doing so. See
36 U.S.C. § 220526(a).
The court also rejected Letendre's first amendment claim, finding plaintiff failed to bring her
claim within the parameters of the circumstances under which a cognizable freedom of
association claim will be recognized-cases involving intimate human relationships, as well as
those involving activities expressly protected under the First Amendment, such as the freedom
of speech or the right to assembly. Id. at 69. Accord, Burrows, 891 F..2d 122 (1989); Zuments v.
Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 737 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Colo. App. 1987); E. N.Y. Youth Soccer
Ass'n v. N.Y. State Pubic High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 488 N.Y.S2d 293, 294-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(holding that "[tihe instant rule does not interfere with parental privacy rights. The choice of
whether to participate in school or nonschool teams remains with the parents and their
children.").
337 Brown v. Oklahoma Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 125 P.3d 1219, 1226 (Okla. 2005) ("All
that is required of the Association is that its rules be reasonable, lawful, in keeping with public
policy, and interpreted fairly and reasonable and enforced uniformly and not arbitrarily.");
IHSAA v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. 1997).
338 694 N.E.2d 222, 228(1nd. 1997).
339 Id. at 233.
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"only where it is willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in
disregard of the facts or circumstances in the case, or without some basis
which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same
conclusion."340
In upholding the IHSAA's application of its transfer rule to a student
who transferred schools for non-athletic reasons without a change of
permanent residence by his parents, the court rendered the student
ineligible to participate in varsity interscholastic athletics for 365 days after
enrollment. The court concluded that the IHSAA's decision was not arbitrary
and capricious, although it was "undisputed that his transfer was neither
primarily for athletic reasons nor as a result of undue influence" by his new
high school.341 Even though it recognized the importance of sports
participation, the court found that it failed to rise to the level of a deeply
rooted historical and traditional fundamental right or liberty that is subject
to constitutional protection.342
3. Analysis and Conclusions
Courts sometimes fail to recognize the important-perhaps unique-
educational benefits derived from interscholastic athletics, which generally
have many positive effects on a student's future personal life and career.
The prevailing judicial approach, which is to accord substantial deference to
state high school athletic associations and educational institutions
regardless of the adverse effects on students who are deemed ineligible,
reflects the judiciary's strong desire to avoid micromanaging the high school
educational process. 343 Thus, many courts justify their refusal to closely
scrutinize the merits of interscholastic athletic participation disputes by
claiming judges are "ill-equipped to make fundamental, legislative, and
administrative policy decisions which are involved in the everyday
administration of a public school."344
340 
ICL
341 Id. at 232.
342 Id. at 242.
343 Wooten v. Pleasant Hope R-VI Sch. Dist. 139 F.Supp.2d 835,842-43 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Jones v.
Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 197 Cal.App.3d 751, 757 (1988) (indicating that "schools themselves
are far the better agencies to devise rules and restrictions governing extracurricular activities.
Judicial intervention into school policy should always be reduced to a minimum").
344 Stewart v. Bibb County Bd. of Educ.. 2006 WL 449197 at *2. Referring to a request by an athlete
that the court ensure that he be afforded meaningful participation on a high school basketball and track
teams, one court responded, "Accommodation of that request would take this judge off the federal
bench and place him on the team's bench next to the coach. Is the athlete getting enough playing lime?
Is the athlete playing the right position? The possibilities are endless." McFarlin v. Newport Special
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In the context of interscholastic sports, parents have attempted to
overcome the strong judicial reluctance to intervene in athletic participation
disputes by asserting a right to control the education of their minor
children. But even courts recognizing this right hold that it does not
encompass parental control over the separate components of their
children's education such as participation in interscholastic athletics. 34s This
is substantially similar to the prevailing judicial approach for resolving
eligibility disputes involving college student-athletes and reflects an
outgrowth of the academic abstention doctrine, pursuant to which courts
defer to the presumed expertise of education officials.
On the one hand, state high school athletic associations and school
officials should be afforded substantial latitude to establish and enforce
academic eligibility requirements that must be satisfied to participate in
interscholastic sports. There is even less of a concern with a student-
athlete's temporary loss of eligibility for engaging in misconduct that
violates a disciplinary code if clear notice of the required standards of
conduct and decorum is provided. Although participation in interscholastic
athletics is not a constitutionally protected right, courts appropriately
recognize at least a limited de jure legal interest by requiring appropriate
notice and a fair opportunity to be heard before a student is declared
ineligible to participate in sports as a sanction for misconduct.346
On the other hand, denying home-schooled children an opportunity to
participate in interscholastic sports arguably deprives them of the full
benefits of a well-rounded education. Such exclusion potentially has a more
significant adverse impact than "outside competition" rules because
alternative local athletic participation opportunities such as club sports may
not be available to home-schooled children. Moreover, excluding all home-
schooled students from any participation in interscholastic sports seems
inappropriate in comparison with the temporary loss of a student's
opportunity to participate in interscholastic sports for academic or
misconduct reasons.
When applying the rational basis or arbitrary and capricious
standards-which both provide only a minimum level of cursory judicial
review-courts rarely render decisions that enable students to participate
in interscholastic athletics. 347 In one of the rare cases applying rational basis
School Dist., 784 F.Supp. 589, 593 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
345 See, e.g., E. N.Y. Youth SoccerAss'n, 488 N.Y.S.2d 293 at 295.
346 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
347 Our research found only a few cases that did so. See, e.g., Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified
141 "
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review decided in favor of a student-athlete, Ruiz v. Massachusetts
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n,348 the court held that a state governing body
should have granted a student a waiver from its transfer rules, thereby
enabling him to participate in basketball at his new high school. It found
that the student's exclusion from athletics did not further the transfer rule's
objective of preventing recruiting or "forum shopping" for athletics reasons
because he transferred from a private to a public school solely for financial
reasons. The court emphasized the importance of athletics to the
educational mission of public high schools, observing that the state
legislature "expresses as public policy the view that athletics constitute an
integral component of public education and should be considered a
fundamental ingredient of the educational experience." 349 However, most
courts still fail to legally recognize this important interest and generally
uphold the rules and decisions of state governing bodies and high schools
(which generally have monolithic state or local control of interscholastic
athletics) that render students ineligible to compete in high school sports.
Sch. Dist., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 471 (Cal. App. 2007) (holding that local athletics conference's
exclusion of student who transferred schools from interscholastic sports, "based on their own
rule whose terms they could not define, was 'illogical and capricious'); Bagan v. N.J.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. BER-C-109-05 2005, WL 1861944 (N.J. Sup. Ch. 2005)
(holding that student was eligible to play football at his new school based on finding that his
transfer was not primarily for athletic reasons); Boyle v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
676 A.2d 695 (Pa.Cmwlth. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 686 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1996) (finding that
application of state high school athletic association's bylaws, which rendered transferring
student ineligible to participate in basketball, was inconsistent with their avowed purpose and
arbitrary and capricious).
348 Ruiz v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. CV0068, 2000 WL 1273381 (Mass. Super. Feb.
7, 2000) (unreported decision).
349 Id. at *3. This minority view was also asserted by the dissenting judge in Jones v. West
Virginia State Board of Education:
[Il]nterscholastic sports "constitute an extension of a good educational program. [TIhe
students who engage in such activities "tend to have higher grade-point averages, better
attendance records, lower dropout rates and fewer discipline problems than students
generally"... [t]hey are "inherently educational" in that they "provide valuable lessons
for practical situations - teamwork, sportsmanship, winning and losing, and hard
work." The participants "learn self-discipline, build self-confidence and develop skills to
hand competitive situations,' all of which contributes to the development of
.responsible adults and good citizens." "Participation in high school activities is often a
predictor of later success-in college, a career and becoming a contributing member of
society."
622 S.E.2d 289, 304 (adopting the view of the circuit court judge who quoted from the National
Federation of State High Schools Association's document entitled "The Case for High School
Activities").
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CONCLUSION AND A PROPOSAL TO PROTECT ADEQUATELY INTERCOLLEGIATE AND
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION OPPORTUNITIES
The important individual and social benefits of athletic participation at
the high school and college levels justify legal recognition and more
significant protection of a student-athlete's opportunity to participate in
sports competition offered by public or private educational institutions.35 0 It
is ironic that participation in intercollegiate and interscholastic sports is a
sufficiently important interest for purposes of applying federal anti-
discrimination laws such as Title IX,3 s1 invalidating an exculpatory waiver of
negligence claims as condition of participating in high school sports,35 2 and
rejecting a public university's claimed sovereign immunity from tort liability
for injury to college athletes,3 s3 but it is insufficient otherwise. Although we
agree that participation in high school or college sports should not be
characterized as a "property right" or a "liberty interest" (much less a
"fundamental right") under the Constitution, the opportunity to do so
currently lacks adequate statutory or common law protection. Legislative
recognition and protection of this opportunity (e.g., giving home-schooled
students a conditional right to participate in sports) would be preferred, but
we recognize the traditional reluctance of Congress or state legislatures to
enact sport-specific legislation that benefits student-athletes.
We acknowledge that it is neither feasible nor appropriate for student-
athletes to participate in the making, interpretation, and application of
eligibility rules for sports competitions offered as part of high school or
college education. Further, it is important that appropriate deference be
given to educational institutions and athletic governing bodies to avoid
judicial micro-management of, and intrusion into, athlete eligibility
disputes. Although arbitration is an efficient process that works well for
resolving athletic eligibility disputes for the few thousand U.S. professional
and Olympic sport athletes, it probably is not a feasible alternative for
resolving eligibility disputes affecting the nation's more than seven million
high school athletes or four hundred thousand NCAA student-athletes.
Moreover, given the current deferential scope of judicial review, the NCAA,
350 We do not assert that elimination of athletic participation opportunities due to budget
constraints or to comply with Title IX is illegal conduct that violates student-athletes' legally
protected rights. However, our strong preference would be to create, rather than eliminate or
reduce, sports participation opportunities for all student-athletes.
3s1 See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
352 Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988).
353 Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006).
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state high school governing bodies, and educational institutions have little
incentive to agree to submit athlete eligibility disputes to final and binding
arbitration. In addition, arbitration may not lead to the development of a
body of uniform precedent that provides clear legal guidance to university
and high school athletics governing bodies and administrators. Other
potential drawbacks to the development of an effective arbitration system
may be a scarcity of arbitrators who possess the requisite sports law
expertise to adjudicate college and high school sports athletic eligibility
disputes as well as an arbitrator's more limited scope of authority to fashion
effective relief vis-A-vis a federal or state judge.
To ensure that student-athletes are not denied the educational benefits
of athletic participation without adequate justification, courts should apply
a higher level of judicial scrutiny than the traditional common law rational
basis or arbitrary and capricious standards. We do not advocate de novo or
strict judicial review, but the significant educational and potential economic
benefits of athletic participation (e.g., a scholarship or professional sports
career) warrant more than courts merely asking the very deferential and
frequently outcome determinative question of whether an eligibility rule or
its application is rational or arbitrary and capricious. We propose a uniform
level of judicial scrutiny that allows a student-athlete to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that his or her exclusion from athletic participation
does not substantially further an important and legitimate interest of an
interscholastic or intercollegiate sports governing body or educational
institution.35 4
This standard would better balance the parties' respective interests in
an athletic eligibility dispute, but it poses the risk of unwarranted judicial
micro-management of high school and college athletics and potentially more
354 In effect, we are advocating that athletic eligibility rules be judicially evaluated in light of
their teleological or purposive nature. See Jonathan Yovel, Legal Formalism, Institutional Norms,
and the Morality of Basketball, 8 Va. Sports & Entertainment L.J. 33, 43 (2009) (summarizing and
advocating "purposive interpretation" of sports governing body rules that affect player eligibility
to participate).
Regarding student-athlete eligibility disputes with the NCAA, it is important to ensure national
uniformity and consistency as well as to avoid a potential Dormant Commerce Clause violation if
multiple, differing state law standards are applied. Therefore, if the Indiana Supreme Court or
legislature adopts our proposed heightened legal standard, we suggest that the NCAA (which is
based in Indianapolis), its member institutions, and student-athletes contract to have Indiana
state law govern the resolution of eligibility disputes. Establishing a uniform national
substantive law for resolving intercollegiate athletic eligibility disputes would be consistent with
the CAS objective of establishing a worldwide, uniform lexsportiva for Olympic and international
sports. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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litigation. On the other hand, because a student-athlete has a significant
burden of persuasion to satisfy, an adverse eligibility determination will be
judicially vacated in relatively few cases. This standard, however, may
provide a means of legal redress that enables athletic participation in the
following examples of cases that we believe were inappropriately decided
against student-athletes: categorical exclusion of home-schooled students
from athletic participation opportunities 355  (although conditioning
participation on appropriate academic requirements and the payment of
reasonable user fees seems appropriate); ineligibility due to a mistake by an
educational institution causing a student-athlete's failure to comply with
non-academic requirements; 35 6 ineligibility to participate in varsity
interscholastic athletics for 365 days despite uncontradicted evidence that
school transfer occurred only for academic, not athletics-related, reasons; 35 7
NCAA refusal to grant a waiver of its post-graduate eligibility rule to a
student-athlete who graduated in two and a half years and was unable to
pursue a graduate degree in a chosen field at her undergraduate
institution; 358 and a university's refusal to reinstate a student-athlete's
eligibility after he was removed from team in alleged retaliation for
successfully appealing a coach's recommendation that his scholarship not be
355 See supra notes 328, 333 and accompanying text.
356 See, e.g., Yea v. NCAA, 171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005); Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 578 S.E.2d
711(S.C. 2003); Perry v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 05-cv-937, 2006 WL 2927260 (S.D.
Ohio 2006). See also Rick Reilly, The Punishment Is the Crime, Sports Illus., Nov. 26, 2007 at 88
(explaining that Washington Interscholastic Athletic Association required high school football team to
forfeit games and not participate in state playoffs because school officials failed to ensure that one
player's physical fitness exam was updated within the required time).
357 As Judge Dickson observed in his dissent in IHSAA v. Carlberg:
The IHSAA's action against Jason is blatantly contrary to the expressed purpose of the
IHSAA Transfer Rule. The IHSAA rules provide that, "Standards governing residence and
transfer are a necessary prerequisite to participation in interschool activities because:
... (5) they keep the focus of students and educators on the fact that they attend school to
receive an education first and participate in athletics second." Record at 170 (citing
I.H.S.A.A. Rule 19(c)(5)) (emphasis added). The trial court found that the Carlbergs have
always put Jason's education first and the IHSAA officials "indicated they had no reason
to believe Jason Carlberg's transfer was athletically motivated." Record at 11. Thus, the
arbitrariness of the IHSAA's application of its rule becomes apparent in the present
case: A rule purporting to limit athletically-motivated transfers and promote education
as the primary value of school in fact punishes a student whom the IHSAA found did not
transfer for an athletic reason and where the uncontradicted evidence points only to
academic reasons for the transfer. Common sense instructs that application of the
Transfer Rule to limit Jason's opportunities for participation would be blatantly
arbitrary and capricious. The trial court was correct in making such a finding."
IHSAA v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 245 (Ind. 1997) (Dickson, J., concurring and dissenting).
358 Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
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renewed. 59 Under this new heightened legal standard, the NCAA would
have a higher burden to justify, for example, its "advertisement and
endorsement,"360 as well as its "no draft" and "no agent" rules, 361 although
these "amateurism" rules ultimately may be upheld under more exacting
judicial scrutiny. At a minimum, a greater scope of legal protection of
student-athletes' athletic participation opportunities would provide a legal
incentive for interscholastic and intercollegiate sports governing bodies and
educational institutions to apply eligibility rules more liberally and to
refrain from restricting athletic participation opportunities unless necessary
to further legitimate objectives. 36
359 Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp.2d 1211 (D. Kan. 2005).
360 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
361 See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
362 We also advocate that courts scrutinize and perhaps invalidate on public policy grounds rules
of restitution promulgated by the NCAA and state athletic associations. A rule of restitution
permits athletic associations to impose particular types of penalties (e.g., forfeiture of games and
vacatur of individual and team records and performances) if an institution is deemed to have
violated an association's rules prohibiting ineligible student-athletes from engaging in
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic competition. See NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 87 (Ky.
2001) (describing and upholding the NCAA's rule of restitution); 2006-07 NCAA Division I
Manual, supra note 210, art. 19.7 (describing penalties that may be imposed pursuant to NCAA's
rule of restitution). The actual or threatened application of rules of restitution provides a strong
disincentive for schools to allow student-athletes to participate in athletic competition even
when athletes have prevailed in litigation against a sports governing body at the trial court level.
Schools fear that an appellate court's reversal of a lower court ruling in favor of a student-athlete
will lead to application of a rule of restitution, which creates a strong disincentive to allow him
or her to participate in athletic competition until the litigation is finally resolved.
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